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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to review the historical 
background of the growing conflict and to examine the rela- 
tions between the two giant countries of Asia, that is, 
China and India. After five full years of arguments on the 
Sino-Indian frontier territory, China and India entered into 
an undeclared war on October 20, 1962.1 The regions con- 
cerned in the present dispute involve more than 2000 miles 
of boundary, starting at the Karakoram Pass in the extreme 
north of Kashmir and extending to the middle of the Assam 
Himalayas. This territory is mountainous, very sparsely 
inhabited, and of no importance to either party except for 
military reasons. It is a romantic region famed in the 
history of the Buddhist religion. So remote and uninhabited 
was this frontier territory that the records show only a few 
cases in centuries in which there is any mention of it. 
These contain no definite proof as to where the frontier was 
at the time. 
This disputed area can hardly be said to be either 
decisively Chinese or Indian. With a pile of maps and 
abundant documents presented by both Peking and New Delhi, 
The Republic Of India, India's Fight For Territorial 
Integrity, (New Delhi, Publications Division, The Govern- 
ment of India Press, 1963), p. 15. 
2 
no definite conclusion regarding the claims of either side 
can be reached by studying them. Each side can produce 
documents establishing administrative and tax control over 
these remote regions. Each side can produce maps allocating 
the area in question to the one claiming it. The Peking 
Government's display of Indian maps in 1954 claimed the 
territory in dispute to be that of China.2 The New Delhi 
Government produced documents to the effect that the Chinese 
maps claiming these areas were in error at the time they 
were produced by the Peking Government. 
The question of where the boundary line was has been 
complicated during the present century because of various 
events. The Indian Government claimed the territory which 
had been claimed by the British Government of India, but 
the Chinese maintained that parts of this territory did not 
really form a part of India and had been claimed only by 
British Imperalists. All these different factors complicated 
the dispute. Where there is such conflict between the state- 
ments of the two sides, it is almost impossible for a pri- 
vate person to reach a conclusion about the territorial 
questions involved. 
The People's Republic Of China, A Collection Of Documents 
of Foreign Relations Of The People's Republic Of China, 
(Peking, World Knowledge, 1958), III, p. 12. (in Chinese). 
3 
On the other hand, it is worthwhile to examine the 
significance of the hostilities which occurred in the fall 
of 1962 at the eastern and western sectors of the Sino- 
Indian border. This conflict created a potential threat to 
world peace. Moreover, it could ultimately involve the 
vital interests of both Western and Communist blocs. The 
latter has been seriously affected by these developments, 
and certain areas of opposition between Chinese and Russian 
interests have resulted in sharp competition. The gap 
between Peking and Moscow became an open conflict in 1960. 
From then on, the two leading Communist countries became 
widely separated. This became more evident in October, 1961. 
This was the year that the 22nd Congress of the Soviet 
Communist Party was held.3 The differences between Peking 
and Moscow were made more serious by the de-Stalinization 
campaign which the then Premier Khrushchev inaugurated at 
that Congress. The 1962 Sino-Indian crisis worsened the 
Sino-Russian relationship. It seemed clear that the Moscow 
Government was on India's side on the Sino-Indian border 
issue. In 1960, facing Russia's policy of friendship with 
India, China intensified her efforts to isolate India by 
making agreements with and concessions to Burma.4 China 
and Russia then seemed to be on the verge of a complete break. 
3 R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, (New York, 
F. A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 78-83. 
4 Daphne E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Treaty", Pacific 
Affairs, XXXIV, No. 2, (Summer 1961), p. 174. 
4 
A few words regarding the two giant nations of Asia, 
that is, China and India, are necessary before considering 
the border dispute. In the first place, it is important 
to make a survey in India. The fact is that India, before 
the border dispute with China began, was unaligned. Its 
government appeared secure, and the country was a show- 
place for those who considered democracy possible in Asia. 
Its economic policy was mildly socialistic, but it care- 
fully abstained from favouring either bloc. Internationally, 
the Government of India stood, in general, for peace and 
conciliation, for which it did useful work, especially in 
Korea during the Korean War in the 1950's. It was the Sino- 
Indian border conflict of 1962 which was a lesson to the 
Indian people. It caused the Indian people to reevaluate 
their foreign policy, especially with the Chinese Communists. 
They reluctantly admitted that their "policy had indicated 
their lack of understanding of the world situation".5 At 
least, they found that China "is. arrogant, expansionist and 
barbarous".6 Thus they gave a clear picture that showed 
that lacking "the understanding of the world situation," 
the Indian people did not find China "an arrogant, expan- 
sionist and barbarous people" until the border dispute began. 
But this was a little late for the Indian people to compre- 
hend such an important fact. 
5 Satyavrata R. Patel, Foreign Policy Of India; An Inquiry 
And Criticism, (Bombay, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd, 1960),p.xv. 
6 Ibid., p. 278. 
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In the second place, China had been affected by the 
border dispute. The Peking regime was the first strong 
government in China for a hundred years. Apart from the 
Communist issue, China seemed to be repeating a pattern 
which had governed its history since the third century B.C. 
The rule had been that, after a period of internal unrest, 
a strong government emerges which gradually loses its 
strength, giving place to a new cycle from anarchy to order. 
The present Government of China, because it is Communist, 
is hated in the West. And therefore, the Chinese Communists 
believe that there must, sooner or later, be a world war 
between Communists and anti-Communists. Thus, only ignorant 
people may believe in the Peking regime propaganda that 
"a socialist China is, and will be, a peace -loving country."7 
The dispute between China and India has not only been 
on geographical questions but also on ideological grounds. 
China respected Marxism-Leninism as its special orientation 
to its nation 
-building. Finally, Marxism-Leninism in effect 
provides a new way of extending China's power in Asia. The 
Chinese have advanced their revolution as a model for the 
under -developed countries. Moreover, the Chinese people 
wanted to show their strongly national force to protect 
China's national interest. Undoubtedly, that national 
7 The People's Republic of China (PROC), The Sino-Indian 
Boundary Question, (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1962), 
p. 105. 
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interest would include the places which Chinese claimed as 
hers in the Himalayan disputed area. 
The problem of the Sino-Indian border has been com- 
plicated during the last fifty years by various events. 
After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, although there were 
some disputes about the frontier between China and India, 
no military conflict occurred until late in 1962. 
The disputed area stretches from Ladakh to Assam. 
It is necessary to explore not only the historical back- 
ground of the disputed area, but also a general review of 
the geography and the people in this area. These have had 
important bearings on the conflict between India and China. 
Furthermore, attention should extend to the neighboring 
area such as Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. In the 
above places, the controversy between China and India was 
created and thus became a part of the reasons which finally 
caused the border dispute to become a military conflict in 
1962. 
CHAPTER II 
GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL FACTORS AS BACKGROUND 
OF THE BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY 
The Three Sectors 
In all the discussions between China and India regard- 
ing their frontier, it is agreed that this frontier can be 
divided into three parts; western, middle, and eastern. 
The whole length of the border stretches from Ladakh in the 
north, near Sinkiang, to the North East Frontier Agency, 
near Burma, on the southernmost point.1 
This disputed area has a 2500 mile border and forms a 
great divide between China and the Indo-Pakistan sub- 
continent. On her side, Red China enjoys an unbroken con- 
trol over the entire length of the border, which is a distinct 
military advantage. This disputed region contains Mount 
Everest (29,028 feet) and more than three dozen peaks, each 
over 24,000 feet in height.2 The upper areas are capped 
with ice and glaciers, often visited by snow and rain, and 
swept by cold, biting winds. It also contains some of the 
world's thickest jungles. This Himalayan border has long 
1 George N. Patterson, Peking vs. Delhi, (New York, F. A. 
Praeger, 1964), p. 167. 
Maharaj K. Chopra, "The Himalayan Border War; An Indian 
Military View," Military Review, XLIII, No. 5, (May, 1963), 
p. 8. 
been considered by Indians as a standing natural guardian of 
the north. 
The Western Sector. The western sector is the bound- 
ary between Kashmir and Sinkiang and Tibet. It starts at 
the Karakoram Pass in the extreme north of Kashmir, and 
extends to the Spiti-Tibet border just north of where the 
Sutlej River cuts its way through the Himalayan range. In 
this portion of the boundary, the main dispute is as to 
Ladakh, which is called Aksai Chi.3 Chou En-lai, Prime 
Minister of Chinese Communists, in a letter to Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru of India dated November 4, 1962, stated 
"the Aksai Chi area has always been under Chinese jurisdiction."4 
Possession of Aksai Chi was proclaimed by the Chinese as 
self-evident, through language and names. Most of these 
place names are identified either as Chinese or Tibetan. 
For instance, Mar-yul, literally "lower land" is the common 
name in Tibet.5 But the Government of India gives a quite 
different account of the matter and maintains that this area 
has always been under Indian administration. 
Ladakh, a part of Jammu and Kashmir State of India, 
has been considered as the center of aggravation during the 
3 
4 
See map A, Appendix 1. 
People's Daily, Peking, November 6, 1962. (in Chinese). 
5 Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback, 
Himalayan Battleground; Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh, 
(New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963), p. 19. 
9 
Sino-Indian dispute. It is not a secret that Chinese have 
recently constructed a road in this area. Ladakh is an area 
that stretches from the Karakoram Pass to the end of the west- 
ern sector and through Chinese eyes, it was a place used by 
Englishmen as a springboard for exploring Tibet.6 Though 
there is now no thought of Ladakh as a part of Tibet, it is 
true that the peoples of these two places are similar.7 
The border between Tibet and Ladakh runs along the 
western most pastoral areas of the Tibet plateau. As Nehru 
stated; "This is an area of mountainous territory of an 
altitude varying from 14,000 to 20,000 feet above sea level, 
with the mountain peaks going up much higher". Therefore, 
this land is not thickly inhabited.8 The eastern part of 
Ladakh has been called "changtang" (high Plain), where the 
amount of level ground diminishes gradually westward. The 
western part of Ladakh has been called "rong" (deep valley). 
The area of Ladakh has about 45,762 square miles and its 
population in 1961 was 195,431.9 Most of the people are 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Tsung L. Shen and Shen C. Liu, Tibet And The Tibetans, 
(Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1953), 
p 8. 
Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontier of China, (New York, 
American Geographical Society, 1940), p. 214. 
The People's Republic of China, Documents On the Sino- 
Indian Boundary Question, "Prime Minister Nehru's Letter 
to Prime Minister Chou (November 16, 1959)", (Peking, 
Foreign Language Press, 1960), p. 133. 
Encyclopedia Britannica, (Chicago, E.B. Inc., 1964), XIII, 
p. 582. 
10 
Buddhists. Leh, an important trade center, is the capitol 
of Ladakh. 
Ladakh received only infrequent mention in the world 
press before the Sino-Indian border dispute began. Today, 
China, India, and Russia confront one another in Central 
Asia under greatly changed circumstances. And the fact is 
that Ladakh is the center of Central Asia. According to 
historical records, this remote territory did not attract 
even the Mongols' attention when the Mongols (the Yuan 
Dynasty of China; 1260-1368) occupied Tibet. From then on, 
Ladakh kept a sort of independent status.10 With its mili- 
tary power, Britain then stretched her influence into this 
remote land in the seventeenth century. In 1842, a treaty 
was signed between Ladakh and Tibet defining the borderline 
of the two as following their "established frontier".11 
When India won her independence, Ladakh then became a part of 
the Kashmir State. 
During the Sino-Indian border dispute, both sides claimed 
to have been administering the area over a long period during 
which they claimed to have sent regular military patrols into 
the area. It is somewhat difficult to draw boundaries on the 
ground in areas which are difficult to approach or settle. 
But the Indian Government insisted "an international boundary 
10 Pedro Carrasco, Land And Polity In Tibet, (Seattle, 
University Washington Press, 1959), P. 19. 
11 Sir Olaf Caroe, "The Geography And Ethnics Of India's 
Northern Frontier", The Geographical Journal. CXXVI, No. 3, 
(September, 1960), p. 303. 
11 
had been shown for nearly a century on official Indian maps 
as it is today. In fact, detailed surveys of the area were 
undertaken in 1867-1868, and the boundary as shown on those 
maps is not only in accordance with tradition and custom but 
is also based on the results of the later surveys:.12 But 
the fact is that India did not give any other strongly approved 
evidence to support her claims. Precisely, only showing its 
own map is not sufficient evidence in this case. Therefore, 
in his letter to Chou En-lai dated November 16, 1959, Prime 
Minister Nehru even admitted "it is obvious that there is 
complete disagreement between the two governments".13 The 
disputes about the Ladakh area finally led to a military 
conflict three years later. 
The Middle Sector. The middle sector, much shorter in 
length, covers the lesser Himalayas at an altitude of about 
15,000 feet and involves the boundary between Himachal 
Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh (both are states of India) and 
Tibet. It runs along the crest of the Himalayas from the 
Sutlej River to the Nepalese border.14 This portion of the 
Sino-Indian frontier has caused less difficulty than the 
eastern and western portions. 
12 
13 
Documents On The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op cit. 
p. 119. 
Ibid., p. 135. 
14 See map A. Appendix 1. 
12 
The main states (in India) in this sector are; Uttar 
Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Uttar Pradesh is an area 
about 113,423 square miles with 73,746,401 population (1961).15 
The capitol of this state is Lucknow. This sector is some- 
times referred to as "the Ari Sector", Ari being a corruption 
of Ngari Khor-sam, a Sanskrit name for southwest Tibet.16 
This area has two special geographical features; the first, 
that the main axis of the Himalayas is divided here by the 
Sutlej River. The second feature is that in many parts of 
it there is a double range of snow peaks, the higher peaks 
mostly in the nearer Indian -ward range, but the lower range 
towards Tibet being the watershed. The first feature is 
notable in the Himalayas for the main axis is divided by 
the Indus River and Brahmaputra River at either end. 
Although this is a high level ground, ancient trade 
routes exist. Merchandise from the Punjab finds its way over 
a height of 18,000 feet into Tibet. The mountains run down 
the entire length from the Himalayas to the sea. Toward the 
south the valleys are narrow. To the northward, the mountains 
are more open and tend to form an elevated tableland which 
merges into the great Tibet plateau. 
15 
16 
Encyclopedia Americana, (international edition), Vol. 27. (New York, Americana Corporation, 1966), p. 843. 
Encyclopedia Britannica. op cit., XXII, p. 917. 
13 
During the period of British rule the state was known 
as the Northwestern Province. The title Uttar Pradesh was 
introduced at the time of the declaration of the Republic of 
India in 1950. It is bounded on the north and northeast by 
Tibet and Nepal and comprises the whole of the upper part of 
the Gangetic basin, from the Himalayas and the Punjab border 
to the Vindhyan plateau. At one end this state rises into 
the Himalayas and includes some of the grandest of the 
peaks which look out upon upper Asia. In this area, the 
Himalayas rise through the foothil ranges, at around 2000 
feet. The Himalayan region has two rainy seasons. The 
population density of this Himalayan region is 130 per 
square mile.17 
The second state in this area is Himachal Pradesh, land 
of Indian union territory lying north and north-northeast of 
the state of Punjab. It is an area about 10,879 square miles 
with 1,351,144 population (1961).18 Most of its inhabitants 
are farmers. This state was constituted in April 1948 by a 
consolidation of 21 former princely Punjab hill states. At 
the present time, Himachal Pradesh is the direct responsibility 
of the central government which controls it through an 
administration. 
17 Ibid., XVIII. p.772. 
18 Loc. cit. 
14 
Though there was no open military conflict in this 
area in the Sino-Indian undeclared war in 1962, the dispute 
about the middle sector still existed. In the note of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of 
China to the Indian Embassy in China dated December 26, 1919, 
the Peking Government firmly claimed its sovereignty over 
this sector. The Government of Peking declared "that this 
sector of the boundary has not been delimited."19 Therefore, 
the Chinese Communists denounced the "principle of watershed" 
which the Government of India proposed and claimed "the 
local authorities of the Tibet Region have all along been 
collecting taxes in these places." Furthermore, China 
pointed out that "nearly all of those who have lived for a 
long time in these places are of the Tibetan nationality of 
China."20 The fact that they argued over this sector in 
1962 does not mean the two countries will compromise. On 
the contrary, both Peking and New Delhi will keep their eyes 
on this sector. Whether to China or India, this portion of 
land is just as important as are the other two sectors. 
The Eastern Sector. The eastern sector is that stretch 
of boundary in the Assam Himalayas between Bhutan and Burma. 
In this portion of territory, India's claim is based upon the 
19 
20 
Documents On The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op cit., 
p. 35. 
Ibid., p. 48. 
15 
McMahon Line. The Chinese, since the frontier disputes 
began, always spoke of this as "the illegal so-called 
McMahon Line".21 The Line was negotiated in 1914 between 
Tibet and the British Government of India. The Chinese 
maintain that Tibet was not an independent power and did not 
possess treaty -making rights. The territory between the 
McMahon Line and the line China claimed (running along the 
foot of the Himalayan range) is in India and is known as 
the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). The area covers 
"32,000 square miles".22 
It is in this sector that the most serious disputes 
lie. The disputed area is about 400 miles long and 75 to 
100 miles wide.23 In this area, Indian claims extend to the 
main Himalayan axis, while China claims a frontier along the 
skirts of the foothills where these merge into the plains 
of Assam only a few miles north of the Brahmaputra River. 
China's claim is in effect based on the border line of the 
British Province of Assam which showed the districts under 
regular administration. India's claim is based on the fact 
21 
The People's Republic Of China, "Note of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of China to the Indian Embassy in 
China, December 26, 1959", The Sino-Indian Boundary 
Question, (Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1962), p. 59. 
22 V. Elwin, "The North East Frontier Agency of India", 
Geographical Magazine, XXIX, (1956), p. 405. 
23 Sir Olaf Caroe, op cit., p. 305. 
16 
that the primitive tribes beyond the administered border 
were for many years under British political control from a 
date early in the nineteenth century. 
There are two states in this disputed area, Assam and 
North East Frontier Agency. Assam, a northeastern state of 
the Republic of India, is almost cut off from the rest of 
the country on the west by East Pakistan and borders, Bhutan, 
Tibet, and Burma. The population of this 47,098 square miles 
of land is 11,860,059 (1961).24 Among those, the majority 
(65 percent) are Hindus, the minority (22 percent) are 
Muslims, while the most remaining are Buddhists. 
The most famous state in this disputed area is the 
North East Frontier Agency. There are 336,558 (1964) settlers 
who live in this remote land of 31,438 square miles.25 This 
is a tangle of sparsely populated mountainous country in the 
extreme northeast of India. It stretches broadly from the 
Brahmaputra River plain in Assam northward to the main 
crestline of the Assam Himalayas and eastward to an irregular 
line passing through a series of lofty peaks. Geographically 
and constitutionally, the agency is a part of Assam. The 
Agency comprises five frontier divisions: Kameng, Subansiri, 
Siang, Lobit, and Tirap. It is inhabited by tribes most of 
24 
Encyclopedia Britannica, op cit., XII, p. 619. 
25 Ibid., XVI, p. 332. 
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which are of Mongoloid stock such as the Monaba and Mishni. 
The capitol of NEFA is Shillong. 
The northern boundary of NEFA, about 550 miles long, 
in dispute between China and India, is known as the McMahon 
Line. Sir Henry McMahon, the then secretary on the Indian 
foreign department and a representative of Great Britain, at 
the conference held in Simla (1913-1914) settled frontier 
and other matters relating to Tibet. Although the Chinese 
Government refused to sign the convention, the Indian 
Government, in 1913, constituted the NEFA as a state of 
Indian territory. 
The Indian Government claimed that it has always 
exercised jurisdiction over this area. But Chou En-lai 
stressed that the Sino-Indian boundary was correctly deline- 
ated in all "traditional Chinese maps" and in the map of 
Tibet and adjacent countries published by the Indian survey 
in 1917 and the map attached to the 1929 edition of the 
Encyclopedia Britannica.26 Furthermore, China denounced the 
McMahon Line. Therefore, the validity of the McMahon Line 
has been the source of most of the controversial issues. 
Since both China and India have different accounts on this 
matter, it is assumed that the border problem of this sector 
26 Documents On the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, op cit., 
pp. 49-53. 
18 
will never be solved without a priority of solving the 
problem of the McMahon Line. 
Tibet: The Land And The People 
The question of Tibet was first put before the United 
Nations in November 1950 - at the time of the forcible entry 
of Chinese Communist troops into Tibet. This attracted 
world-wide attention. Unfortunately, it was immediately 
overshadowed by the Korean War.27 The Tibet case was, 
therefore, shelved at the United Nations. It was not until 
1959, when the Dalai Lama escaped from Tibet, that the 
question of Tibet was again brought up and formally placed 
on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.28 
Although the question was discussed, no solution satis- 
factory to all sides has yet been formed. 
Tibet lies roughly between the 28th and the 36th 
parallels of north latitude and 79th and 99th of east long- 
itude. Its area in 1950 was estimated to be about 500,000 
square miles. Chinese Communists have recently published 
the population of Tibet as 1,274,969.29 According to the 
27 
28 
Dalai Lama, My Land and My People, (New York, McGraw- 
Hill, 1962), p. 86. 
Ibid.. pp. 220-221. 
29 J. P. Mitter, Betrayal of Tibet, (Bombay, Allied 
Publishers, 1964), p. 1. 
19 
Theory of Harmony among the five races (Han, Manchu, Mongol, 
Hui, and Tibetan) advocated by Sun Yat-sen,3° Tibet was 
regarded as a component part of the Chinese nation. Most of 
the Tibetans live in Tibet itself, while the rest live in 
southwestern Kansu, northeastern Szechwan, and the mount- 
ainous areas of Yunnan, Tsinghai. Most Tibetans are believers 
of Lamaism, which tremendously influences Tibetan society. 
Early Contact With China and Britain. In comparison 
with India and China, Tibet entered the historical phase 
at a late period. The first unification was in the sixth 
century. Years after the introduction of Buddhism, the 
monks began to be appointed "ministers".31 The Mongols 
occupied Tibet in 1247.32 At the time the Yuan Dynasty col- 
lapsed, the Tibetans then could organize their own govern- 
ment. From the fourteenth century to the seventeenth, China 
was under the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).33 Tibet maintained 
a general cordial relation with China in those years. The 
history of the Ming Dynasty records many peaceful missions 
30 
Sun Yat-sen, San Yin Chu I - The Three Principles of 
People (a selected speeches), trans. into English by 
Frank W. Price. (Chungking, Ministry of Information 
of the Republic of China, 1943), p. 12. 
31 Carrasco, op cit., p. 19. 
Loc. cit. 
33 Emily Hahn, China Only Yesterday, (New York, Doubleday 
& Co., 1963), p. 15. 
32 
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to and from Tibet. Though the routes can easily be traced, 
the place names are sometimes confusing. 
After Manchu set up the Ching Dynasty in Peking in 
1644, the Dalai Lama visited Peking in 1651 and was warmly 
received.34 The friendly relations between the Emperor of 
the Ching Dynasty and the Dalai Lama gave powerful aid to 
the Chinese Government by his great name. At the same time, 
the recognition of the Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist 
world naturally added enormously to the strength of his 
position and enhanced his prestige. 
The earliest attempt to map the whole of Tibet scienti- 
fically was made by order of the far-seeing Chinese Emperor 
Kang Hsi.35 Between 1708 and 1716 data were slowly collected. 
The first map of Tibet was completed in 1717.36 In the same 
year, the Sixth Dalai Lama asked help from Peking to push 
out the rebels. This brought about the direction of China 
in Tibet affairs. Several years later, the Chinese intro- 
duced a number of reforms in the Tibetan administration 
that stabilized the organization of Tibet during the remain- 
ing years of the Ching Dynasty. 
34 
35 
36 
S. S. Tso (ed), A Collection Of Documents Of Modern 
History; 1800-1900, (Taipei, Chung Hwa Co., 1958), 
p. 609. (in Chinese). 
0 -Yang Wu Wei, "Sino-Indian Border & McMahon Line", 
Issues and Studies, (Taipei, September 1963), I. no. 9 
p. 571., (in Chinese). 
Tso. op cit., p. 612. 
21 
After the fall of the Ching Dynasty the Lhasa Govern- 
ment asserted its independence from China and came under 
British influence. Since it was both Tibetan and British 
policy to keep Tibet closed to all outside influence, most 
of the native rulers of the small state of Eastern Tibet 
were suppressed during this period, although in large part 
the Tibetan forms of local government persisted.37 In 
general terms, it was due to the folly and arrogance of the 
Manchus in later times, the weakness of their military force, 
and the influence of foreign powers that Tibet drifted 
gradually away from its traditional position in China. 
The impact of the west, so far as Tibet is concerned, 
was not felt until 1768. The Court of Directors of the East 
India Company recommended the obtaining of information regard- 
ing the promising market in 1768.38 From then to late in the 
nineteenth century, the Englishmen kept step in Tibet with a 
kind of cool reception. Panchen Lama once considered that 
the English were "fond of war, and after insinuating them- 
selves into a country, raised disturbances and made them- 
selves masters of it".39 
37 Carrasco, op cit., p. 19. 
38 Tieh T. Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, (New York, 
King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 71. 
39 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 
22 
By its powerful army forces, Britain forced the govern- 
ment of the Ching Dynasty to sign a series of treaties on 
Tibet late in the nineteenth century. From those treaties 
40 
of 1890 and 1893, the British received various privileges 
in Tibet which were not to be enjoyed by the Chinese in any 
British Colony. The British, having decided to eliminate the 
Chinese factors in the controversy, made various attempts to 
open direct negotiations with the Tibetans. After the 
failure to make direct negotiations with the Tibetan author- 
ities, Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of British Government in 
India, sent a letter to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama on August 11, 
1900.41 The letter was unexpectedly sent back after six 
months. Curzon then sent his second letter to the Dalai 
Lama. It had the same fate as the first one. The information 
which at this period reached India from Tibet was rare, 
"unreliable and difficult to evaluate".42 
The Agreement Of 1904. After years of fruitless talk 
with the Chinese Government, on June 3, 1903, Curzon dis- 
patched Colonel Younghusband to Lhasa with an armed escort 
of 200 men.43 The aim of the mission was to talk with the 
Chinese and Tibetans directly. From the moment that the 
40 
41 
Ibid., p. 80. 
Peter Fleming, Bayonets To Lhasa; The First Full Account Of The British Invasion Of Tibet In 1904, (New York, 
Harper and Brother, 1961), p. 31. 
42 Ibid., p. 36. 
43 Li, op cit., p. 87. 
23 
armed mission began to approach the frontier, both Tibetan 
and Chinese representatives continued their protest against 
the mission. Ignoring the protest, the mission kept going 
and reached Lhasa on August 3, 1904.44 Under the British 
military pressure, the Chinese Commissioner to Tibet, Yu -tai, 
signed the Lhasa Agreement of 1904.45 The Court of the Ching 
Dynasty refused to ratify the Treaty and fired Yu -tai because 
the treaty would draw Tibet into the sphere of British in- 
fluence. 
The significance of the Lhasa Agreement of 1904 lies 
in the competition for Tibet which was created between China 
and Britain. Let us see then what encouragement China could 
have from the treaty. Whether the British Government would 
still regard Tibet as China's province or only recognize 
China as the supervisor of Tibet was in doubt. The fact 
that Britain sent a military expedition to Lhasa without 
consulting China had already imperiled her position. This 
was the main reason why the Government of China never could 
claim any sovereign rights to Tibet from then on to the end 
of the Dhing Dynasty. 
Tibet And The Republic Of China. When China was pro- 
claimed a republic (1911), efforts were soon made to regain 
control of Tibet. Seats were allotted to Tibet in the 
44 Ibid., p. 92. 
45 Tso, op cit., p. 618. 
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National Assembly and the five 
-colored national flag had the 
black bar to stand for Tibet. On April 12, 1912, President 
Yuan Shih-kai issued a proclamation declaring that Tibet, 
Mongolia and Sinkiang would be regarded as on equal footing 
with the provinces of China proper and as "integral parts" 
of the Republic." Yuan could not carry out his proclama- 
tion, however, by China's weak national force. From 1916 
on, China hardly had a single year without civil conflict. 
Foreign menace, other than that of Japan, was temporarily 
lightened because of World War I, but internal dissension 
went on with ever greater destruction. 
Chiang Kai-shek unified the nation in 1928.47 Unlike 
the Communists, Chiang did not use his powerful army to settle 
the outstanding Tibet issue. The reason of Chiang's peace- 
ful settlement was affected by the following factors: Firstly, 
from a theoretical point of view it would be self-defeating 
if the National Government, which stood for equality of all 
states within the Republic and for harmony and peace, should 
use force to subdue the Tibetan people. Secondly, the National 
Government in carrying out its Northern Expedition, had 
encountered repeated menaces from the foreign powers. It, 
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therefore, was not in a position to force the Tibetan issue, 
which would give offense to Great Britain. And it was 
always the British who had to be taken into account if any 
solution of the Tibetan issue was to be effective. Thirdly, 
the international situation would not allow the National 
Government to adopt such a risky measure as a military 
campaign in Tibet. The Nationalist forces succeeded in 
knocking out the leading warlords, but there soon developed 
dissension among its own ranks. Fourthly, the National 
Government, since its removal from Canton to Nanking, had 
become more compromising than revolutionary in character. 
The complexity of the situation on the spot would make any 
government hesitate to start a military campaign against 
Tibet. 
Though there was sporadic light fighting between the 
Tibetans and Liu Wen-hui, a Szechwan warlord,48 the relations 
between the National Government and Lhasa can be considered 
as friendly. The National Government indeed did not re- 
establish China's original position in Tibet. The reason 
for refusing to have a close relation with China was that the 
Tibetans could not depend on a weak Chinese Government. 
Indeed, only a united and peaceful China could give Tibet 
needed assistance and protection. If Tibet had entirely 
48 Huang, op cit., p. 337. 
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turned away from powerful Great Britain and leaned toward 
a divided China fully engaged in international war or civil 
war, it would have stood the risk of endangering its own 
existence. Unfortunately, China, since the establishment of 
the Republic, had hardly enjoyed any peace. 
Tibet And China After World War II. After World War 
II, the Tibet issue became more complex than before. The 
fact that China was victorious did not help to solve the 
issue. The independence of Outer Mongolia deeply hurt 
Chinese prestige and inspired the Tibetans to follow the 
example of their kindred Mongolians. Therefore, the declar- 
ation made in the Constitution adopted by the Chinese National 
Government to guarantee Tibet's autonomy failed to receive 
support of the Tibetans.49 
While the Civil War between the Kuomingtang and the 
Chinese Communists made the Tibetans hesitate to come to 
terms with the Government of Nanking (the then Capitol of 
National Government) even if they had the intention of doing 
so, the same international development alienated them and 
encouraged them to assert immediate independence. 
In 1947 Great Britain recognized the independence of 
India.50 This development must have greatly affected the 
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status of Tibet. The Indian assumption of the role previously 
played by the British can also be seen from the Indian meas- 
ures adopted in connection with Tibet. Proclaiming an 
independent state, Tibetan delegates attended the Asiatic 
Conference of March 1947 in New Delhi.51 
Facing A Red Dragon. After Chiang's administration 
evacuated from the Mainland to Taiwan in 1949, the Tibetan 
authority cut relations with the National Government and 
expelled the Chinese officials.52 The fourteenth Dalai Lama 
claimed Tibet as a "de facto" independent nation ever since 
1912.53 
However, the Chinese Communist Government has not 
accepted the Dalai Lama's proclamation. In 1950, the Red 
Army reached Tibet. By proclaiming Tibet as an "integral 
part" of China, the Peking regime mobilized its forces and 
defeated a limited number of Tibetan warriors in October 
1950.54 Simultaneously with the Chinese military expedition 
into Tibet, various messages were exchanged between the 
Chinese Communist and the Indian Government. The Indian 
Government expressed its "deep regret" and asked Peking to 
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ease the war with .peaceful means.55 Peking replied, "Tibet 
is an integral part of China and the Tibet issue is an 
entirely domestic problem", and declared that its army must 
enter Tibet to "liberate the Tibetan people and to defend 
the national frontier".56 When the diplomatic duel between 
Peking and New Delhi could not make for any good but instead 
made the situation worse, the Lhasa Government turned to the 
United Nations for help. As there was not a single vote in 
the United Nations to support Tibet's request, the Tibetan 
appeal was set aside. In September 1951, Red Forces entered 
Lhasa and set up the Tibet area as a military district. 
Escape And Asylum. In February 1959, people from all 
parts of Tibet gathered together in Lhasa for a solemn re- 
ligious festival. According to the account given by the 
Chinese Communists some two months later, the Tibet Local 
Government carried out a series of provocative, anti 
-Chinese 
acts, thereby creating a tense situation. In March, it was 
rumored that the Chinese intended to arrest the Dalai Lama 
as a hostage to discourage a Tibetan rebellion.57 The 
hatreds between the Chinese and the Tibet Local Government 
rapidly grew, and the Dalai Lama had no other choice than to 
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flee. He left his palace on the night of March 17, 1959, 
and entered India on March 31.58 
After their failure to prevent the flight of the Dalai 
Lama, the Peking regime made the Panchen Lama the acting 
chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet 
Autonomous Region.59 At the same time, the Red Chinese 
were notably silent on the true nature of the explosive 
situation, especially the continuing flight abroad of 
Tibetans. This fact, of course, has played a prominent role 
in the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations, breaking out 
in late 1962 in open conflict. The increasing controversial 
Tibetan issue has raised more disputes between China and 
India, for the Chinese viewpoint is that Tibet is an "Inte- 
gral part" of China. But through Indian eyes, the view is 
60 that "Tibet serves as a spring board southward to India". 
Therefore, the Chinese Communist suppression of Tibet has 
"Agitated Indian public opinion".61 
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Sinkaing And The Himalayan States 
Sinkiang. Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), like Tibet, 
is a part of the encircling land frontier of China. Its 
history and modern problems are inseparable from those of 
China. This, the biggest province of China, has more than 
600,000 square miles and thirty five million population.62 
Sinkiang is situated north of the Tibet highland and 
borders on three central Asian republics of the Soviet 
Union, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan. Aside from 
the highland margins that penetrate into Sinkiang from the 
south, the region can be divided into three major subregions, 
the rugged Tien Shan (Mt. Heaven) mountain system in the 
center, separating the Dzungaria basin in the north from the 
larger Tarim basin in the south. As to its people, the 
Sinkiang region are 75 percent Uigur.63 
The Chinese Emperor ruled this remote area, but the 
power often remained in the hands of local people. The 
province which is really a group of native protectorates has 
been closely linked with China from the Han Dynasty (206 
B.C. - 220 A.D.).64 In the following years, however, 
Chinese authority over what is now Sinkiang has only been 
in effect for some 425 years, which was divided into several 
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periods, of which the present Chinese overlordship is the 
fifth important period.65 The present geographic boundaries 
of Sinkiang, and its tribal and administrative organization, 
follow the lines laid down under the Ching Dynasty (1644-1911).66 
The Emperors of the Ching Dynasty accomplished their aim of 
political authority only in a very small measure by direct 
conquest. The Government of China relied chiefly on setting 
one tribal element against another and then coming forward 
to act as arbitrators, when the different rivals were ex- 
hausted by local warfare. China also then arranged settle- 
ment on the basis of the tribal spheres of interest. 
Between 1865 and 1877, the whole tribe of Kashgaria, 
bordering on British India, claimed its freedom from China. 
To crack down on the uprising, the Manchu House dispatched 
General Tso Tsung-tang and his powerful semi -modern equip- 
ped army to this remote area. Moving on into Sinkiang, Tso 
and his men were victorious over those local tribes. Tso 
Tsung-tang then reestablished the state and local govern- 
ments.67 The high ranking officials of both organizations 
were all Chinese. The Chinese governing minority in Sinkiang 
is comparable to the British element in India. But the dif- 
ference was that there was no solid connection between 
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Sinkiang and Peking. This was partly due to a poor trans- 
portation system and to a series of uprisings which occurred 
constantly in Kansu, the province in the middle of the 
Sinkiang -Peking route. Since Sinkiang is divided from 
China by great distances and formidable deserts, there is 
only one main cart -road approach, through Kansu. Conse- 
quently, the relations between Sinkiang 
-Peking have always 
been somewhat distant. 
At the time of the Chinese Revolution in 1911, the 
position held by the Manchus passed to the Chinese. The fall 
of the Empire immediately caused a series of outbreaks in 
Sinkiang. A Chinese named Yang Tseng-hsin took over the 
state and the local governments under a system of dictatorial 
control. This former appointee of the Ching Dynasty main- 
tained general authority on the local issues.68 In the fol- 
lowing twenty years, Yang and his government lived almost 
completely at peace. After Chiang Kai-shek completed the 
well known Northern Expedition in 1928, the Nanking Govern- 
ment then decided to discontinue the native state adminis- 
tration. It is probable that the year of 1929 marks the 
peak of Chinese expansion in Sinkiang, Tibet, Manchuria, and 
69 Mongolia. From then on, the government of the Republic 
of China claimed Sinkiang as one of its provinces. The ef- 
fective government over Sinkiang lasted until 1949, the year 
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that Red China took over the mainland. It was from the 
year of 1949, the Peking regime deliberately sent a large 
number of Hans to Sinkiang and set up a series of industrial 
firms. Along with these actions, the Government of Chinese 
Communists has always kept close watch on the border question. 
Sikkim. Sikkim is a tiny state situated between Nepal 
and Bhutan, bordering Tibet on the north and India on the 
south. There are only 162,189 people (1961) in this land of 
19,500 square miles.70 Most of them are farmers. The capitol 
of this tiny kingdom is Gantok. This smallest country of 
Asia was found by a group of immigrants from Tibet in the 
sixteenth century.71 Not much attention was paid to this 
remote land, and the Lhasa Government maintained only a 
loose relationship with Sikkim. On the other hand, under 
the initiative of its agents, the aggressive British Govern- 
ment in India infiltrated into this tiny kingdom and put it 
under British influence in 1861.72 
After years of military pressure, Sikkim yielded to 
Britain and signed the Agreement of 1861. By the Agreement, 
Sikkim agreed to refer any disputes or questions between its 
people and those of neighboring states to the arbitration of 
the British Government and to abide by its decision. 
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According to Article 19 of the treaty, Sikkim agreed not to 
lease or cede any part of its territory to the third nation 
without the permission of Britain.73 From then on, the 
great success of British colonial expansion placed this 
mountainous kingdom's foreign relations under British control. 
In 1886, a group of Tibetan troops invaded Sikkim and 
74 caused a tense situation between China and Britain. Once 
again, the Government of the Ching Dynasty yielded to power- 
ful Great Britain. A convention was held in 1890 by the 
delegates of China and Britain in Calcutta. In the same 
year, the Sikkim Treaty was signed by China and Great Britain. 
From this treaty, China recognized British supremacy in 
Sikkim. By Article I of the treaty, the boundary of Sikkim 
and Tibet "shall be the crest of the mountain range separat- 
ing the waters flowing into the Sikkim Teesta".75 This 
Treaty, indeed, marked a real beginning of international 
complications on the Tibet issue. 
After the independence of India, Sikkim then fell 
under India's sphere of influence. In June, 1949, Indian 
troops invaded Sikkim and appointed a commissioner to take 
73 
74 
75 
Li, op cit. p. 78. 
Alastair Lamb, The China 
-India Border, (New York, Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 38. 
William. F. Mayers (ed), Treaties Between The Empire Of China And Foreign Powers, (Shanghai, North China Herald, 1902), p. 211. 
35 
over the administration.76 Naturally, this former British 
protectorate thus came under the influence of India. 
Furthermore, the Government of India maintained three roads 
to Sikkim. 
Bhutan. Bhutan has assumed importance in the Sino- 
Indian border dispute, with China seeking to extend the 
borders of Tibet, which it dominates. This tiny kingdom 
occupies, with Sikkim, the southern slopes of the Himalayas. 
The capitol is Punakha. This remote land ranges from the 
high valleys into the foothills and the jungle in the im- 
mediate plain. There is as much as 300 inches of rain 
fall each year. 
This tiny kingdom is situated on the east of Sikkim, 
north of India. The rest of the border faces Tibet. In 
Bhutan, as in Sikkim, the population consisted of different 
groups. The people of the mountain area are Tibetans, while 
those of the plains are Hindus. The people of former part 
are Buddhists of the Red Hat Sect. Their language is Tibet. 
After its subjection to British influence, Bhutan received a 
large number of Nepalese settlers.77 Within its 2745 square 
miles of land are 726,853 people (1964).78 
Bhutan was a dependency of Tibet in the late eigh- 
teenth century. Like Ladakh, Bhutan has, on occasion, 
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appealed to Lhasa for the settlement of their ruler's prob- 
lem. During this period, Bhutan had a strong bureaucratic 
organization entirely under the control of the Church. In 
1826, the Government of Britain took over Assam and put 
Bhutan under its sphere of influence.79 Forty years later, 
the Treaty of Sinchula was made by Bhutan and Britain. By 
this treaty, Bhutan accepted the status of a British pro- 
torate and became the recipient of a British subsidy.80 
Under its terms, Bhutan ceded Athara Duras to Great Britain. 
Furthermore, the Government of Bhutan also agreed to arbi- 
tration by the British Government in all disputes between 
Bhutan and Sikkim. 
The second treaty was made between Bhutan and Britain 
in 1910. By this treaty, the Government of Britain com- 
pletely controlled Bhutan's affairs. British influence in 
Bhutan, as in Nepal, depends on maintaining British prestige 
and eliminating Chinese temptation. The various British 
proposals concerning Tibetan boundaries during the Simla 
Conference (1913-1914) were to a great extent influenced by 
this fact. In 1947, an agreement was renewed between Bhutan 
and India after the Independence of India.81 Although the 
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Chinese Government, has disclaimed on paper any claim over 
Bhutan, the Government of Bhutan, fearing Chinese Communist 
aggression, has built roads and strengthened its defense 
beginning in the 1950's. 
Nepal. Nepal, the largest among three Himalayan 
states, lies on the west of Sikkim. In 1964, the population 
of this 54,362 square miles of land was 9.8 million. Most 
of the people depend on farming.82 Preoccupied by cultural 
influence and settlers from Tibet, Nepal, like its sister 
countries - Sikkim and Bhutan, had a close relationship 
with Tibet before eighteenth century. Then the aggressive 
Gurkhas (a tribe from India) invaded Nepal in 1760.83 With 
its great expansion, the Gurkhas threatened the rest of the 
slope of Himalayan range. The outcome was intervention 
from China. Failing against the powerful intruding Chinese 
army, Nepal then became a Chinese tributary state with the 
obligation to send a tribute mission to Peking once every 
five years. This mission was continued until the fall of 
the Ching Dynasty in 1911. In the early nineteenth century, 
the British took over China's place and put Nepal under 
British influence. On the other hand, Nepal maintained a 
rather friendly relationship with the Ching Dynasty. And 
it was true that China always considered Nepal as its 
dependent. When the Manchus fell, the Nepalese Government, 
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like that of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, regarded itself as in 
no way bound to the Republic of China. 
Aware of the border question, the Government of 
Britain then never ignored the geographical importance of 
Nepal. Up to the present, the Government of India as its 
predecessor, has paid a close attention to this remote land. 
CHAPTER III 
THE McMAHON LINE 
On October 22, 1962, while President John F. Kennedy 
of the United States spoke to the American people on radio 
and television about the Cuban crisis, half way around the 
world Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India spoke to his 
countrymen over the radio about the Himalayan border crisis. 
In his broadcast -to -the -nation speech, Mr. Nehru said that 
he considered "China's aggression" on the Ladakh frontier 
and on the North East Frontier Agency a "menace to freedom".1 
He condemned Chinese military action and stated: 
Our border with China in North East Frontier 
Agency region is well known and well established 
from ages past. it is sometimes called the McMahon 
Line. ... This has been acknowledged as the border 
by history, tradition and treaties long before it 
was called the McMahon Line. The Chinese have in 
many ways acknowledged it as the border, even 
though they have called the McMahon Line illegal.2 
Since then, the Sino-Indian border dispute has resulted in 
military conflict. And this has focused attention on the 
McMahon Line. 
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It is true that both the land and the names of areas 
in the regions concerned in the Sino-Indian dispute are un- 
familiar to most of us. But it is also correct to say that 
many people have read or heard the term "McMahon Line". The 
term "McMahon Line" has been closely connected with the issue 
of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Therefore, consideration 
of the McMahon Line should take precedence in the study of 
the Sino-Indian border dispute. Precisely, the McMahon Line 
is the most controversial issue in the border dispute. 
Although, through Indian eyes, the McMahon Line is a "tra- 
ditional boundary" between the two nations,3 Chou En-lai, 
the Prime Minister of Chinese Communists firmly announced: 
The so-called McMahon Line was a product of 
the British policy of aggression against the Tibet 
region of China. ... (the McMahon Line) has never 
been recognized by any Chinese Central Government. 
The term McMahon Line has been in the news in con- 
nection with the Sino-Indian border issue for a long time. 
It owes its name to Sir Henry McMahon, the then Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs in the British -Indian Government. 
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He negotiated with the representatives from both China and 
Tibet in 1913-1914 at Simla, India.5 The outcome of this 
meeting was a treaty co-signed by the representatives from 
both Tibet and Britain. The main part of the treaty is the 
demarcation of the border between India and China. This is 
the line which has created many disputes between China and 
India. 
Because of the importance of the McMahon Line which 
forms the eastern China -India boundary and a portion of the 
northern China -Burma Boundary, it seems best to review its 
historical background as the starting point for this paper. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that primary emphasis 
has been placed on the Indian portion of the line, because 
of the settlement of the China -Burma boundary problem in 
1960.6 
Historical Background 
After the fall of the Ching Dynasty of China in 1911, 
the Lhasa Government asserted its independence from China. 
Noticing this, Yuan Shih-kai, the then President of the 
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young Republic of,China, declared on April 12, 1912, that 
Tibet, Mongolia as well as Sinkiang would be regarded as a 
part of China.7 In the following years, a series of con- 
flicts occurred between Tibetans and Chinese for control of 
this state. Since then it has been the Chinese policy to 
introduce direct Chinese Government in this area and to 
consider this area a part of China. 
The first impact between Lhasa and Peking was in 1912 
when the Thirteenth Dalai Lama issued a declaration of 
independence. He listed as his chief grievance, China's 
inability to protect Tibet from aggression.8 In this an- 
nouncement, he did not define clearly what he meant by 
"aggression". But one thing for certain was that "aggression" 
was not from China. In other words, it meant that the 
"aggression" was from the South and the source was the 
British. A review of the historical records gave support 
to the idea that the above hypotheses might be right. How- 
ever, Tibet being a small weak country and the realization 
that Tibet would have to fight her own battles. Tibet felt 
compelled to yield to the British and adopt an unfriendly 
attitude toward China that is Tibet had to stay with the 
7 Ta-shou Huang, The History Of China, (Taipei, Great China 
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British and find a way to maintain peaceful relationships 
with the British. 
It is true that the British Government did play an 
important role behind the scene. And it is quite clear that 
the British Government was not prepared to admit the right 
of China to intervene in the internal administration of 
Tibet. They would not tolerate the maintenance of an un- 
limited number of Chinese troops in Tibet. This meant that 
the Government of Britain did not respect the Anglo-Chinese 
Convention of 1906.9 By this treaty, Chinese influence in 
Tibet was confirmed. Furthermore, the treaty recognized 
that China had the right not to permit any foreign state 
to interfere with the territory or internal administration 
of Tibet. Since China was not included in "foreign states", 
it was completely legal to adopt the policies which sub- 
ordinated Tibet to her. 
The Chinese Government, however, had to yield to the 
pressure of the British in face of internal difficulties as 
well as international developments. The central administra- 
tion in Peking could hardly command the respect of many 
southern provinces.10 The international prospect was even 
9 Alastair Lamb, The China -India Boundary. (New York, 
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worse since Russia, the only power that could be expected to 
counteract any British action in Tibet, was engaged in 
carrying out her own design in Mongolia. Besides, there were 
strong indications that similar action might be taken by 
other powers in their respective spheres of influence, 
especially the Germans in Shangtung and the Japanese in 
Manchuria.11 
In such a bad situation, Yuan Shih-kai reluctantly 
pulled his army out of Tibet late in 1912 and restored the 
title of Dalai Lama to the Thirteenth early in the following 
year.12 
As to Great Britain, she was enjoying her successful 
colonial expansion into Tibet. Moreover, the British 
Government demanded a tripartite conference which would 
include Britain, China, and Tibet. As expected, the Chinese 
Government turned down the request. China argued that the 
existing treaties, signed by Britain and China, had clearly 
defined Tibetan status. The Government of China considered 
that the two signers should respect the "Anglo-Chinese 
Convention of 1906".13 Therefore, China believed that 
there was no need to negotiate a new treaty. 
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13 Lamb., op cit., p. 134. 
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Along with its mighty military power, the British 
Government continued its previous demand. It is not hard to 
find out that there were at least two factors from which 
the British demand originated. In the first place, the 
British Government found that it was necessary to consoli- 
date its own position in Tibet by having a new treaty. 
Secondly, the British Government wanted a new treaty to re- 
affirm its influence in Tibet and to resolve the worrying 
on the outcome of the Tibet -Mongolia Pact. 
It is not difficult to understand the concern of the 
Government of Britain about the Tibet -Mongolia Pact. From 
the British viewpoint, the Pact simply would weaken London's 
influence in Tibet. In January 1913, the representatives of 
Tibet and Mongolia secretly signed the Tibet -Mongolia Pact 
at Urga (Ulan Bator, the capitol of Outer Mongolia).14 In 
this treaty, both sides declared themselves free from Manchu 
domination. Moreover, the two signers asserted their 
position as independent states. Britain was concerned that 
the treaty might give the Russians the advantage of extend- 
ing their influence through the medium of Mongolia to Tibet. 
British concern was not only limited to Russia's ambitions 
but also encompassed the Japanese expansion. From 1906 to 
1916, a series of secret conventions between Japan and 
14 
Ibid., p. 143. 
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15 
Russia was made. Acting as a host of Mongolia, Russia 
then invited the Japanese to this remote land. Facing this 
serious situation, the British Government could not wait 
any longer but threatened China that: 
.. if China should again refuse to take 
part in a meeting with a view to conclude a new 
treaty, the Government of Britain would directly 
negotiate one with Tibet alone.16 
It was under such pressure that the Chinese Govern- 
ment notified the British Minister of its readiness to 
discuss the Tibetan problem. Therefore, the British 
Government had accomplished its first demand and was ready 
to carry out its ambition in the future to hold a tri- 
partite conference. Because there was no other choice, both 
Peking and Lhasa accepted the British invitation to attend 
the meeting.17 
The Simla Conference 
The Simla Conference, a meeting initiated by the 
British Government and reluctantly agreed to by the Chinese 
15 Owen Lattimore, Studies In Frontier History, (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 261. 
16 
17 
Tieh-tseng Li, The Historical Status of Tibet, (New York 
King's Crown Press, 1956), p. 134. 
The meeting was held at Simla, a small town in the 
northern part of Uttar Pradesh near Sutlej River. 
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lasted from October 13, 1913 to July 24, 1914.18 
The participants in their agreeing to have this meet- 
ing showed that the British Government had won the first 
round of this diplomatic battle. In the first place, having 
Simla as the meeting place was a deliberate choice to em- 
phasize the importance of the border question. In the 
second place, ignoring the strong protest of the Peking 
Government, the London administration invited Lhasa to 
participate in the conference. It would show clearly that 
China was already yielding to Britain on the matter of con- 
flict over Tibet. By those deliberate actions, Britain 
showed not only its great power but also its attitude toward 
Tibet. Therefore, that this fateful conference brought a 
temporary settlement but a permanent dispute should not 
surprise anyone. 
The attendants,of this conference were Chen I -fan 
(Ivan Chen), Special Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in 
Shanghai, Sir Henry McMahon, Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs in the British -Indian Government, and Lonchen 
Shatra, chief Tibetan delegate.19 It was clear that the 
Tibetan delegates were on an equal footing with their former 
18 
19 
Esson M. Gale, "International Relations: The Twentieth 
Century", China, Harley F. McNair, (ed), Chapter XII, 
(Berkley, Calif., University of California, 1947), p. 
206. 
Lamb, op cit., p. 144. 
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master, the Chinese delegate, in this meeting. This sign- 
ificant point became a sound argument in the very beginn- 
ing of the conference. 
The first meeting of the Simla Conference was held 
on October 13, 1913. As expected, the Chinese representa- 
tive objected to the Tibetan delegate having equal status 
with the Chinese delegate, but later agreed to continue 
the meeting.20 
In this tripartite meeting, Lonchen Shatra insisted 
on the return to Tibet of all the land as far as Tachienlu 
(now in Hsikang Province of China) and the extension of the 
Tibetan territory to include Kokonor (name of a lake in 
Chinghai Province).21 To this unreasonable demand, even 
Sir John Jordan, the then British Minister to Peking, 
stated: 
The Tibetans, in my opinion, have always 
been very unreasonable about the boundary and 
have claimed a frontier right away to Tachienlu. 
No one could make me believe that Tachienlu and 
Batang are not Chinese.22 
However, Sir Charles Bell also conceded that some of the 
districts claimed by the Tibetan delegate had been brought 
20 
21 
22 
Patterson, op cit., p. 172. 
0 -Yang Wu-wei, "Sino-Indian Border dispute", Issues 
and Studies, I, No. 9. (September 1964), p. 577. 
Li, op cit., p. 136. 
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under Chinese control during the last two hundred years.23 
Then came the Chinese objection. The Chinese counter- 
proposal consisted of the following items: (1) Tibet 
should be regarded as an integral part of China; (2) China 
would not convert Tibet into a province; (3) Britain should 
not annex Tibet or any portion of its territory; (4) A 
Chinese Resident should be stationed in Lhasa; (5) The 
foreign and military affairs of Tibet should be under 
Chinese direction; (6) Tibet should not enter into nego- 
tiation or agreements with any foreign country except through 
the Chinese Government; and (7) The Tibetan boundary should 
not extend into the province of China.24 
Since the proposals presented by Tibet and China for 
the solution of their border troubles were so far apart, no 
progress was made at this early part of the meeting. As a 
middle man, the British delegate then suggested dividing 
Tibet in two divisions, Inner and Outer Tibet.25 
To this proposal several questions could be raised: 
What was the real intent of this proposal? Was this pro- 
posal a fair solution to both China and Tibet? And was 
23 
24 
25 
Sir Charles Bell, Tibet, Past and Present, (London, 
Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 152. 
0 -Yang, op cit., p. 578. 
Lamb, op cit., p. 143. 
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this proposal made by British in "good faith"? For the 
first question, the answer was that the proposal was de- 
signed to benefit Great Britain. To the second and the 
third questions, the answers, as will be shown, were both 
negative. 
To Sir Henry McMahon, the Russia's achievement in 
Mongolia was a successful accomplishment. Russia forced 
China to redefine the border between Outer and Inner 
Mongolia. The outcome was that the Outer Mongolia fell 
under Russian control. On the other hand, the Chinese 
Government still controlled Inner Mongolia. For this 
reason McMahon thought the best thing for Britain was to 
divide Tibet into two parts as Russia had done to Mongolia. 
From this fact, it is not hard to find out that Britain 
was the very one who wanted to put Tibet under its control. 
But most of the westerners believed that the McMahon's pro- 
posal was not an example of aggressive self-interest. In 
his book, The China -India Border, Alastair Lamb (Professor, 
University of Malaya) considered the motive of McMahon's 
proposal was just a plan to have an autonomous Tibet, a 
"buffer between China and the British Indian frontier".26 
But Mr. Lamb did not explain why the British Government 
did not plan to have Punjab of Uttar Pradesh as "buffer" 
between Tibetan and British Indian frontier. Perhaps the 
26 Ibid., p. 144. 
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right answer to this question is that China was a poor 
and weak country during the early part of the century. 
Therefore, those western colonial powers always won vic- 
tories over China both at the battleground and at the con- 
ference table. 
As expected, China again yielded to McMahon's pro- 
posal and agreed to negotiate about the division of Tibet. 
From then on, the argument, shifted to the delimitation 
of the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet. 
The McMahon Line 
Late in the conference, Sir Henry McMahon proposed a 
draft convention which consisted of eleven articles and 
seven exchanges of notes. The main parts of the draft con- 
vention included the following items. China's suzerainty 
over the whole of Tibet was to be recognized together with 
the autonomy of Outer Tibet. Both Great Britain and China 
were to respect the territorial integrity of the country, 
and to keep hands off the internal affairs of Tibet. China 
would be forbidden to send troops, civil, or military officers.27 
China might maintain a Resident in Lhasa, and 300 escorts 
could stay with this Resident. As in Inner Tibet, China 
could maintain her administrative system. Tibet would not 
27 
P. C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy, (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 21. 
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be represented in the Chinese Parliment or any other 
similar body. China would pledge not to convert Tibet 
into province, while Britain would not annex any Tibetan 
territory or station troops, civil, or military officers, 
or establish colonies in Tibet. The special interest of 
Great Britain in the existence of an effective government, 
and in the maintenance of peace and order in the neighbor- 
hood of the frontier of India was to be recognized. The 
British Trade Agent could visit Lhasa with escort. Britain 
would enjoy Tibet's most favored nation treatment. Britain 
would be a mediator between the disputes of China and 
Tibet.28 
The most important part in this draft convention was the 
delimitation of the border line. From the British sug- 
gestion, the border between Outer and Inner Tibet would 
roughly follow along the Upper Yangtze River.29 The border 
between China and India, as well as between China and Burma, 
was also regulated by the draft convention. The line 
between Inner and Outer Tibet, McMahon marked out with blue 
color, while the other international border line was marked 
in red. This red line extended along the crest of the 
28 0 -Yang, op cit., p. 579. 
29 See map A, appendix I. 
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Himalayas from Bhutan on the west to a point called Isu 
Razi on the Mekong Salween watershed in the east. It began 
in the west at approximately 91° 40" E., 27° 45" N., on the 
eastern border of Bhutan and proceeds in a northeasterly 
direction for 250 miles through a region with mountains 
ranging from 15,000 to 23,500 feet in height. The line 
ended on the present Burma -China border at a point approx- 
imately 98° 27"E., and 27° 40"N.30 
Under much pressure from the British, Ivan Chen, the 
head delegate of China reluctantly signed the draft con- 
vention, but the reaction from Peking was such that the 
Chinese Government promptly repudiated the agreement. 
Since the Government of China refused treaty, 
therefore, according to international law, the treaty was 
illegal. In his book, International Law, Dr. D. P. O'Connell 
considered, "the necessity for the ratification is the 
primarily constitutional".31 This gave Chinese a good 
reason to refuse recognition of the Simla Convention as a 
legal international treaty. And from then on, Chinese 
always claimed that the agreement was a defective one. In 
other words, it meant that the McMahon Line should not 
30 
31 
United States Air Force Operational Navigation Chart, 
sheet H-10, The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, (Naga 
Hill, September, 1961). 
D. P. O'Connell, International Law, Vol. 1, (New York, 
Dobbs Ferry, 1965), p. 245. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CHINA -INDIA CONTROVERSY 
A friendly Sino-Indian relationship was rooted in 
their history for over three thousand years. There was 
almost never an armed conflict between the two countries. 
The only invader of India, Genghis Khan,1 a Mongol soldier, 
came from the north. Since it was hard to travel over the 
Himalayan mountains, the people of the two countries had 
but rare chances to associate with each other. Only monks 
traveled to the other side of the Himalayas. Therefore, 
Buddhism had been and still has strong influence on the 
Chinese mainland. 
But everything is different at the present time. 
Modern transportation facilities have complicated the 
relationship between China and India. It is not because 
there are no Buddhists in India, but rather due to a series 
of complicated events which just have happened between 
these two giant Asian nations. The controversy between 
Peking and New Delhi has caused the gap between them to 
1 
Genghis Khan, (1162-1227), founder of Yuan Dynasty, 
conquerer of the Asian mainland, Near East, Eastern 
Europe. European considered his western expedition as 
"yellow peril". 
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enter into discussions of the boundary. At this time, 
World War I started. From then on, Britain (later its 
successor, India) and China did not pay much attention to 
this matter.32 The reasons given by the then Chinese 
Government for refusing to ratify the Simla Convention 
were as follows: (1) All the places west of the Salween33 
shall be placed within the limits of the autonomy of Tibet. 
(2) Tibet should be recognized as a region of China. (3) 
China could not agree with the prospective blue line.35 
In the face of the Chinese repudiation, Britain then 
signed a bi-lateral treaty with Tibet. The demarcation of 
the boundary line was the most important part in the con- 
vention. From then on people called this line the McMahon 
Line. 
Since the treaty did not well define the Sino- 
Indian border, and the refusal to ratify the treaty by the 
32 
Shen and Liu, op cit., p. 51. 
33 A river originated in Hsinkang, China via pass Burma into Indian Ocean. 
34 
35 
Patterson, op cit., p. 172. 
Sir Olaf Caroe, "The Geography and Ethnics of India's 
Northern Frontier", United Asia, XII, No. 4, (August, 
1960), p. 231. 
34 
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Peking Government, the McMahon Line was not a final settle- 
ment for the border issue but a source of future trouble. 
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grow wider and wider. And eventually it led to a military 
conflict in 1962. Therefore, it is essential to examine 
the controversial factors involved before discussing the 
Sino-Indian Conflict. 
Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai2 
The relationship between China and India was a very 
friendly one even as recently as 1949, the year the Chinese 
Communists took over the entire Chinese mainland. After 
centuries of aloofness between the two nations, they drew 
together during the early 
self was fighting against 
this old but weak country 
twentieth century, for India her - 
British imperialism. 
was striving hard to 
her political entity against a whole series of 
powers, Western and 
against imperialism 
As to China, 
maintain 
imperialist 
Eastern. Out of this common struggle 
emerged new ties of friendship, new 
sympathies, a new desire to help each other and to learn 
of each other. China watched with great interest Mahatma 
Gandhi's non -cooperation and civil disobedience movement of 
1920-1921. Sun Yat-sen, the then leader of the Chinese 
revolutionary movement, in his lecture on the methods of 
Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai; Indian and Chinese are brothers. 
P.H.M. Jones, "Passes and Impasses: A Study of the Sino- 
Indian Border Dispute:, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
XXXIX, No. 9. (February, 196e), p. 444. 
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nationalism, which was later incorporated in his "Three 
People's Principles", pointed to the Indian movement as an 
object lesson for the Chinese Nationalist.3 On the other 
side, the Indian people also paid their high respect to 
China's revolutionary movement. 
Moreover, the Chinese and Indian delegates, in 1927, 
issued a joint statement at the Congress of the League 
against imperialism and refused "the use of Indian troops 
in China to protect the imperialist interests of Great 
Britain".4 In 1937 and 1938 the Indian National Congress 
passed resolutions expressing its sympathy with the Chinese 
in their struggle against the western powers. After the 
Sino-Japanese War broke out on July 7, 1936, the Indian 
people organized a boycott of Japanese goods in India. 
Furthermore, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru went on a good -will mission 
to China in August 1939. Nehru spoke at Chungking over the 
radio.5 In his speech, Nehru stressed the importance of 
Sino-Indian cooperation "for the sake of the freedom of 
our dearly -loved countries, for Asia and for the world" 
3 
4 
5 
6 
P.Y.A. Lineburger, The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, 
(Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1937), p. 180. 
Satyavrata R. Patel, Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry 
And Criticism, (Bombay, N.M. Tripathi Ltd., 1960), p. 161. 
China's National Capitol during World War II, in Szechween 
Province. 
6 P.C. Chakravarti, India's China Policy, (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 6. 
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In return, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek paid 
a state -visit to India and exchanged good -will wishes each 
for the other's country in 1942. In fact, Chiang urged 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, the then President of the United 
States, to bring pressure upon Churchill to free India. 
Those were the days of the first Sino-Indian honeymoon.7 
These two great nations of Asia established their relation- 
ship on the basis of freedom and true understanding. 
The dreams, however, did not last very long. With the 
end of World War II, a new situation emerged in Asia. The 
victory of the Allies meant a victory for China. She had 
already been accepted as a major power at the Cairo Con- 
ference of 1943.8 Furthermore, as one of the Five Major 
Powers, China attended a series of important international 
meetings. China was a charter member of the United Nations, 
and had been seated as a permanent member in the Security 
Council. For India, too, victory was in sight in her 
struggle for independence. In 1946, India became an inde- 
pendent nation. Other Asian nations were also on the march 
and some of them, such as Burma and Ceylon, had many 
cultural ties with India. Under these new conditions, re- 
lations between India and China could not stay unchangeable. 
7 
The second Sino-Indian honeymoon would be the days in the 
early 1950's. 
Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese, Their History and 
Culture, (New York, McMillan Co., 1961), p. 452. 
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In his broadcast speech from New Delhi dated September 7, 
1946, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru stated: 
... realize that we were yet on the march 
and the goal had still to be reached. There 
were many difficulties and obstacles on the 
way and our journey's end might not be so near 
as people thought. Any weakness now, anx 
complacency would be fatal to our cause. 
Mr. Nehru was right when he pointed out, "any weakness ... 
would be fatal to our cause". And it is clear to see that 
a great "weakness" in India's foreign policy is having a 
giant neighbor on the north side. 
In analyzing the gigantic changes that were taking 
place in China in the year of the Chinese Civil War, a 
distinguished Indian author observed: 
A mighty convulsion is shaking the land of 
Confucius. For four thousand years the Chinese 
peoplejlave been kowtowing before their ancestral 
tombs," seeking an answer to life in the past. 
But now, almost for the first time ... the common 
people of Cathay are beginning to stand erect and 
seek an answer to their problems in the future. 
For better or for worse, the Chinese Communists 
have succeeded in awakening, in millions of people, 
a sense of personality. 11 
9 
10 
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected 
Speeches, (New Delhi, The Publication Division, Gov't 
of India, 1961), p. 99. 
A reverence made by prostrating and knocking the heads 
on the ground. 
11' Dinkar Sakrikar, "Sino-Indian Border Dispute", United 
Asia, XII, No. 2, (April 1960), p. 109. 
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In reviewing the developments of Sino-Indian border dispute, 
it is not hard to find out that Chinese now "stand erect 
and seek an answer to their problems. ...". 
The year of 1949 was a very unusual one for the 
Chinese. In this year, Red China took over the mainland 
from the hands of the National Government. The National 
Government evacuated to Taiwan. Since then, the Indian 
people have had to face an extremist progressive Communist 
regime from the north. Therefore, a more complicated 
situation was created by these new international relations. 
The relationship between China and India was very 
friendly during the first decade after the Chinese Com- 
munists took over 1949. India was the first 
country after Burma in the Free World to recognize the Red 
Chinese Government. In a parliamentary speech, Nehru said 
that "it was not a question of approving or disapproving 
the changes that have taken place. It was a question of 
recognizing a major event in history and appreciating and 
dealing with it."12 Nehru soon found that there were many 
obstacles ahead in the business of "dealing with" China. 
The relationship between these two countries was once 
shadowed by the Korean War and the Tibetan incident in 1950. 
12 Patel, op cit., p. 161. 
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As the time passed, China and India drew together 
once again. They walked hand in hand on the international 
stage. Unable to refuse the strong demand from China, India 
did not attend the San Francisco Conference of September 
1951, for signing the Japanese Peace Treaty.13 From then 
on, there was much progress in creating good relationships 
between China and India. This result came about partly as 
a result of Nehru's efforts to please China. But Chou 
En-lai, the Prime Minister of the Peking regime, also con- 
tributed his work to strengthening this friendship. In a 
letter to Nehru dated April 29, 1954, Chou stressed the 
importance of "peaceful co 
-existence" shortly before the 
Gcneva Conference began.14 The two prime ministers then 
announced the five principles of international relations 
known as PanchShila. The principles were incorporated in 
the final communique of the Afro -Asian Conference in 
Bandung, Indonesia. The five principles are the following 
items:" 
(1) Mutual respect for territorial integrity and 
sovereignty. 
(2) Non 
-aggression. 
(3) Non-interference in internal affairs. 
(4) Equality and mutual benefit. 
13 
14 
Ibid., p. 168. 
A Collection of. Documents of Foreign Relations of the 
People's Republic of China: 1954-1955, Vol. III, 
Peking, World Knowledge, 1958), p. 10 (in Chinese). 
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(5) Peaceful co-existence.15 
This new Chinese diplomacy was intended to demon- 
strate China's peaceful intentions towards neighboring 
states and in particular to discourage the South and South - 
East Asian nations from alignment with the West. But to 
Jawaharlal Nehru, China's "peaceful co -existence" proposal 
seemed the only way to solve the world problems. Thus, in 
the speech in Lok Sabha16 dated September 17, 1955, Nehru 
stated: 
. that war does not solve any major issues and 
that, therefore, all problems, however different., 
and intricate, should be approached peacefully.'" 
Unaware of the Chinese Communist aggressive character, 
Nehru and his people greatly enjoyed the peaceful atmosphere 
between these two giant Asian nations. This brought India 
and China together in the next three years after the Panch- 
Shila announcement in 1954. Therefore, it is correct to 
say that the two nations enjoyed this second honeymoon. It 
was the time of "Hindi Chini bhai bhai". 
15 
16 
17 
Sharokh Sabavala, "Reaction In India". The New Leader. 
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As expected, the second honeymoon did not last very 
long. The major reason was that India's attitude toward 
China was only determined by her unrealistic assessment 
of Chinese leadership. In Nehru's eyes, the need of the 
moment was peace, particularly in Asia. The only power 
that might disturb Asian peace was China with her ambitions. 
Nehru strongly believed that once those ambitions were 
satisfied, China would settle down to peaceful internal 
development. Nehru believed that friendly policies would 
solve the problems and maintain the peace. Nehru was so 
naive that he even considered that China and India were 
"meeting one another in South 
-East Asia once again and, 
as in the past, there was no hostility between them."18 
The fact is that there was and still is hostility between 
China and India. The trouble was that Mr. Nehru was not 
aware of all the real controversial situations between 
his country and China. 
18 
Asian Recorder. New Delhi. (December 1956), pp. 1182-1185. 
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The Korean War 
The first impact between China and India happened 
during the Korean War. The Chinese Communist Government 
gave moral support to the North Korean attack against South 
Korea, in June 1950 and reacted sharply to the intervention 
by the United Nations forces in Korea. In his letter to the 
Security Council of the United Nations dated August 20, 
1950, Chou En -tai maintained that the United States was the 
number one war criminal and, thus, the United Nations 
mission to Korea had seriously endangered world peace.19 
But the United Nations did not pay much attention to this 
paper protest. Moreover, this world body dispatched the 
United Nations police forces to maintain the integrity of 
the Republic of South Korea. 
The role which India played in the Korean War gave 
a clear picture that Nehru was 
China. When the war broke out 
the United Nations' resolution 
trying to avoid annoying 
in. June 1950, India supported 
condemning North Korea as an 
aggressor and calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of the 
northern forces from South Korea. But when Communist China 
began to show resentment against the steady advance of the 
19 
A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the 
People's Republic of China: 1949-1950, op cit., Vol. I, 
p. 133. 
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United Nations forces, the Indian attitude was surprisingly 
changed. In fact, India almost identified herself with the 
Chinese view that the crossing of the 38th parallel amounted 
to a direct threat to the security of China, and if Peking 
had sent its forces into North Korea, it had done so in 
self-defense. Therefore, India seemed to refuse to accept 
the United Nations' responsibilities under the United 
Nations Charter. As in his book, Peking vs. Delhi, George 
Patterson considered that the India policy "could not both 
support the United Nations' position and at the same time 
contribute troops as she should have done."20 
When the United States presented a draft resolution 
to the Political Committee of the United Nations General 
Assembly stating that Red China had engaged in aggression 
in Korea, the Indian delegation opposed the resolution on 
the ground that India was "not convinced that the partici- 
pation of the Chinese forces in the fighting in Korea was 
21 due to any aggressive intention." On the whole, India 
had played her part well in pleasing China in the United 
Nations on the Korean issue. However, India remained 
20 
21 
George Patterson, Peking vs. Delhi. (New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963), p. 110. 
Ibid., p. 110. 
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chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission 
until the end of the Korean War. India found that the role 
of chairman was not a very pleasant job. Both Syngman Rhee, 
the then President of South Korea, and Mao Tse-tung com- 
plained about the way India managed Chinese war prisoners. 
Nehru then realized that to maintain friendship with the 
Chinese Communists was a difficult task. 
The Communist Party Of India 
Before Indian independence, the Communist Party of 
India (CPI) never made much progress in its efforts to in- 
filtrate the nationalist movement or appeal to the mass of 
people. But a great change occurred in the 1950's. Since 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was so strong and success- 
ful, the CPI, therefore, inevitably followed the so called 
Neo-Maoism in the early 1950's.22 According to Maoism, 
the CPI emphasized the policy of a collaboration govern- 
ment. Which meant that the CPI and the other parties 
should work together. Mao also advocated that using ballot 
boxes was the easiest way to gain political strength. 
Indian Communists now sit in all or nearly all of the State 
Legislative Assemblies, and they are particularly strong in 
22 Norman D. Palmer, The Indian Political System. (Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961), p. 203. 
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West Bengal, Andhra, and Kerala.23 Therefore, the develop- 
ment of the CPI has attracted much attention among Indian 
people. Since the CPI had close relations with Peking, 
the majority of the Indian people consider the CPI as 
Peking's vanguard. 
It is true that Peking's ambition is to be a leader 
in Asia. The existence of the Communist Party in most of 
her neighboring countries made it easier for Peking. But 
the worst thing for the Indian people is that in India 
China has the greatest fifth -column because the CPI is the 
largest minority group. This focuses attention on the 
possibility of a link -up between the Chinese Communists 
inside the Himalayas. 
The Tibetan incident of 1950 drew the CPI and the CCP 
together. In the early part of this year, Mao Tse-tung, 
in a letter to the CPI, stated: 
relying on the brave CPI and the unity and a 
struggle of all Indian patriots, India certainly 
will not remain long under the yoke of imperialism 
and emerge in the Socialist and People's Demo- 
cratic family. That day will end the imperialist 
reactionary era in the history of mankind.24 
In return, the CPI responded in its "notes of the week" in 
23 Ibid., p. 204. 
24 People's Daily. Peking. January 21, 1956. (in Chinese). 
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the New Age Weekly.25 
It is common knowledge that the People's 
Government of China respects Tibetan customs 
and autonomy to such an extent that it is not 
even introducing the reforms and social changes 
that are being implemented in the rest of 
China.26 
Furthermore, Mr. B. T. Ranadive, the General Secretary 
of the CPI, criticized the Indian's China -Policy. He chal- 
lenged Nehru's view that China had been primarily respon- 
sible for the deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. He 
expressed the view that "if Indians feel hurt at the change 
of expansionism levelled at a few among them, should not the 
Chinese feel hurt when their government is attacked as an 
aggressor and charged by the Prime Minister of India with 
deception?"27 
Contrary to this pro -China policy, Mr. Nehru's firm 
stand during the late 1950's to Chinese Communist both on 
the border issue and other developments created further 
differences between Nehru's Government and the CPI. Thus, 
the Sino-Indian "friendly" relationship deteriorated. 
Therefore, the Chinese Communist leaders 
25 
26 
The New Age Weekly, an official organ of the CPI, 
published in Bombay. 
Girilal Jain, PanchSheela and After; A Re -Appraisal of 
Sino-Indian Relations in the context of the Tibetan 
Insurrection. (New York, Asian Publishing House, 1960), 
p. 184. 
27 
Ibid., p. 188. 
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left the CPI leaders no doubt that their sympathies and 
support were with the left. The Chinese influence has con- 
tinued to be the left-wing group. Moreover, the Chinese 
have been behind those leaders of the militant group who 
show signs of emerging as a force on the Indian national 
scene. Thus, in his book Panch-Sheela and After, Mr. Girilal 
Jain considered that "the reactionaries in India were working 
to ruin relations with China".28 
Tibet Revolt 
The first major test of Indian foreign policy, and 
the first major clash between Peking and New Delhi, occurred 
over Tibet. Therefore, the Tibetan issue worsened the Sino- 
Indian relationship and eventually led to an open military 
conflict in 1962. A review of Red China's foreign policy 
will show it is related to the Sino-Indian controversy over 
Tibet. 
On October 1, 1949, the Chinese Communist Government 
announced the following intentions in foreign affairs: 
(1) To protect China's independence, freedom 
and integrity. 
(2) To work for lasting international peace 
and friendly cooperation between all 
countries. 
28 Ibid., p. 198. 
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(3) To establish cordial relations with foreign 
governments whose attitudes were friendly. 
(4) To unite with the Soviet Union and other 
Communist states and movements in the 
struggle against the imperialists and in 
particular the United States. 
(5) To protect the riats and interests of the 
overseas Chinese. 
By the pledge of "protect China's ... integrity", Peking 
regime shows its will to extend into those parts of Chinese 
territory still under Nationalist Chinese contro1.3° The 
Chinese Communist leaders also apparently had in mind the 
recovery of authority over areas which had become detached 
from China in the past. 
It became clear later that the Chinese Communists 
were thinking in particular of Tibet, of certain border 
territories controlled by India and Burma. They hoped to 
develop strong influence in these regions by encouraging 
and supporting the local Communist movements. It meant that 
the march to Tibet from Peking was a step to "protect China's 
... integrity". Facing such a situation, it was impossible 
to expect a friendly relationship would exist between China 
and India. Lacking mutual understanding, the "Hindi Chini 
bhai bhai" era was merely a political drama. 
29 A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the 
People's Republic of China, Vol. 1, op cit., p. 1. 
30 Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, Matsu. 
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In October 1950, after announcing its intention to 
"liberate Tibet by peaceful or other means,"31 the Peking 
regime ordered the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to 
advance toward Tibet. About forty thousand Chinese troops 
crossed the eastern border of Tibet. On October 21, a 
memorandum was delivered by the Indian Ambassador to Peking, 
stating: 
a military action at the present time against 
Tibet will give those countries in the world 
which are unfriendly to China a handle for 
anti -Chinese propaganda at a cruci§1 and delicate 
juncture in international affairs. -32 
Another note was dispatched from New Delhi to Peking on 
October 28, reiterating that "the decision to order the 
advance of China's troops into Tibet appears to us most 
surprising and regrettable."33 The Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs replied on October 30, that "Tibet is an 
integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet 
is entirely a domestic problem of China." Therefore, the 
Peking Government considered that "the regional (Tibet) 
autonomy granted by the Chinese Government to the national 
31 
32 
33 
A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the 
People's Republic of China. Vol. I, op cit., p. 165. 
Ling Nai-min, Tibetan Sourcebook. (Hong Kong, Union 
Research, 1964), p. 10. 
Ibid., p. 11. 
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minority inside the country is an autonomy within the con- 
fines of Chinese sovereignty.134 
When Peking and Delhi once got acquainted with each 
other, they soon were concerned about Tibet. However, with 
the signing of the Sino-Tibetan agreements on May 23, 1951, 
the situation regarding Tibet eased -- at least temporarily. 
The major provisions of this agreement include the follow- 
ing: 
(1) The Tibetan people shall return to the big 
family of the motherland - China. 
(2) The Tibetan people have the right to exercise 
regional autonomy under the unified leader- 
ship of Chinese Government. 
(3) The central authority will not alter the 
existing political system in Tibet. 
(4) The policy of freedom of religious belief 
laid down in the common programme shall be 
carried out. 
(5) Tibetan troops shall be reorganized step by 
step into the PLA and become a part of the 
national defense forces. 
(6) The Central People's Government shall have the 
centralized handling of all external affairs 
of the area of Tibet.35 
There were two significant points mentioned in the 
above agreement. First, China regarded her measures con- 
cerning Tibet since 1950 as an exercise of sovereign rights 
34 Ibid., p. 13. 
35 Frank Moraes, The Revolt In Tibet. (New York, McMillan 
Co., 1960), pp. 65-66. 
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within Chinese territory while India emphasized the auton- 
omous nature of Tibet. The second point is that the Agree- 
ment of 1951 gave Lhasa substantial autonomous rights and 
until the Tibetan local government took up armed insurrection 
in March 1959, China had adopted a soft policy in making 
changes in Tibet. 
After 1951, there were frequent and close contacts 
between China and India. In 1954, both Nehru and Chou 
played very important roles in the Bandung Conference, and 
a Sino-Indian Agreement was signed by Peking and New Delhi 
in the same year. It is true that during those years, the 
relationship between China and India was enjoyed in the 
atmosphere of "Hindi Chini bhai bhai". 
Some controversial cases occurred during that period, 
but were not made known to the public. Late in 1955, the 
Indian Government announced that Chinese troops had oc- 
cupied some disputed territory at a place called Bara Hoti.36 
During the following August, the Indian Government announced 
that a few Chinese soldiers had entered Indian territory but 
left when requested.37 Therefore, both sides did their best 
to maintain friendship. 
Bara Hoti; in Chinese called Wu-je, a place west of 
Nepal. This two square mile place lying at over 16,000 
feet had no strategic or other importance for either 
country. 
37 Jones, op cit., p. 443. 
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A turning point came when open revolt broke out in 
Lhasa in March, 1959. As expected, the Tibetan people re- 
organized themselves and attacked the Han people after Red 
China's nine years of control. The main reason for the 
revolt was that the Tibetans wanted to keep their own way 
of life. The conflict between China and Tibet is just like 
what Nehru described: "A dynamic, rapidly moving society 
on one hand and a static, unchanging society, fearful of 
what might be done to it in the name of reform on the 
other."38 
The Tibetan people's revolt against China started on 
March 9, 1959, when demonstrations broke out in Lhasa.39 
The Tibetans believed that the Dalai Lama would be kidnapped 
on March 10. On March 17, the Dalai Lama and his followers 
left his palace secretly for India. Three days later, the 
Chinese army started to counterattack.40 The revolt then 
became a whole scale conflict between the Tibetan people and 
the Han people. 
38 
39 
Nehru, op cit. Speech at the Parliament dated April 27, 
1959. p. 319. 
Jones, op cit., p. 444. 
40 Dalai Lama, My Land and My People. (New York, McGraw- 
Hill Co. 1962), pp. 164-200. 
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To India, the Tibetan revolt was sudden and unexpected. 
It was true that the actions of the Chinese Communists in 
Tibet in 1959 hit India like an icy blast from the high 
Himalayas. Thus, the revolt did provoke a marked change 
in Indian public moods and attitudes, as well as in official 
policy. The widespread expression of sympathy for Tibet was 
given from both the Parliament and Indian people. Then a 
Chinese accusation through the HsinHua Agency (Chinese 
official news agency) to India worsened the already thin 
Sino-India friendship. The HsinHua Agency accused that 
the rebellion in Tibet was "engineered by the Imperialists, 
... the commanding centre of the rebellion was in Kalimpong."41 
This announcement led to an immediate storm of protest. 
Mr. Nehru spoke in the Lok Sabha on March 30. He announced 
that "it is wrong to say that the Kalimpong was the centre 
from which anti -Chinese activities were directed." He 
then continued that although "it is important for us to have 
friendly relations with the great nation - China, our 
sympathies are with the Tibetans. We want them to progress 
in freedom."42 No doubt, this word agitated the Peking 
Government. Chinese then fired back with a Resolution on 
41 
42 
Jones, op cit., p. 445. 
Nehru, op cit., p. 133. 
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the Question of Tibet which adopted, on April 28, by the 
first Session of the Second National People's Congress of the 
Chinese Communists. In this resolution, Chinese condemned 
Indian Imperialists for "scheming the Tibetan rebellion 
and interfering in China's internal affairs with the 
intention to split Tibet from China."43 
Warnings and threats to India were also on their way. 
On April 30, 1959, the People's Daily held out the threat; 
"we give solemn warning to imperialists and Indian expansion- 
ists. You must stop at once, otherwise you will be crushed 
to pieces under the iron fist of 650 million Chinese 
people."44 
From then on, tons of letters, editorials, and ex- 
change of notes blasted each other. Apparently the "Hindi 
Chini bhai bhai" era was over. But the worst thing did not 
happen until August 28, 1959. On that day, Nehru told the 
Lok Sabha that "a detachment of Chinese troops, 200 to 300 
strong, crossed into the Subansini Frontier Division in the 
North East Frontier Agency and fired on the Indian Picket 
Post of Longjn on August 25."45 
43 
44 
Tibetan Sourcebook. opcit., p. 388. 
People's Daily, Peking. April 30, 1959. (in Chinese) 
45 Nehru, op cit., p. 335. 
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Since then, the relationship between the two nations 
deteriorated steadily and finally an open military con- 
flict broke out in 1962. 
CHAPTER V 
BORDER DISPUTE 
The tragedy of Tibet cast a deep shadow upon Sino- 
Indian relations. It undermined India's faith in Chinese 
intentions. On the other hand, it agitated the Chinese 
Government against the Government of India. Facing such a 
situation, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru still consider- 
ed Sino-Indian relations one of the important factors in 
maintaining world peace. In his speech at Rajya Sabha 
dated September 10, 1959, the Prime Minister admitted that 
he had been "surprised at the recent developments."1 But 
in his speech in Lok Sabha just five days earlier, Nehru 
said that "it is important, even essential, that these two 
countries of Asia, China and India, should have a friendly 
and cooperative relationship."2 His efforts to maintain 
and promote such relationship made him partially blind to 
the full implications of Chinese policies and actions. On 
the other hand, in all the communications which Chou En- 
lai, Prime Minister of Communist China, addressed to Nehru 
about violations, there were references to PanchShila and 
1 
2 
Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy; Selected 
Speeches. The Publications Division, The Government of 
India, 1961. p. 352. 
Ibid., p. 344. 
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"age old friendship", but the emphasis was unmistakenly 
on China's pretended right based on her national interest. 
Therefore, it is safe to say that India's China policy 
lends itself to a comparison with the policy pursued by 
western statesmen toward Adolf Hitler in pre -Munich years. 
In both cases, the primary weaknesses were misjudgments 
on the rival's real long-term intentions. As time passed, 
Nehru realized to some degree the real danger of the sit- 
uation. He spoke to the Lok Sabha on November 27, 1959, 
stating that the issue between China and India was of the 
"biggest magnitude - a matter of the utmost significance 
to the present and future of India and Asia".3 
The Himalayan States 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Himalayas, the 
Chinese had worked hard to strengthen their defense line. 
In Sinkiang, the Chinese had been building up basic 
industrial complexes and pushing through a program improving 
transportation. Apart from the Sinkiang -Tibet highway (730 
miles) through Aksai Chin, China constructed six new roads 
in Ladakh.4 Other roads were built along the McMahon Line 
3 
4 
Ibid., p. 368. 
Anna L. Strong, "The China -India Border", New World Review, 
XXVII, No. 10, (November 1959), p. 50. 
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and the Napalese frontier. It was clear to see that new 
roads in Tibet "could not be for the purpose of trade, 
although the Chinese said that trade was their main reason 
for building them. The roads had to be for military pur- 
pose."5 On a conservative estimate, the Chinese troops in 
Tibet, "in combat readiness were more than six divisions, 
a Chinese division usually consists of 15,000 men".6 
Both China and India competed hard over the three tiny 
Himalayan Kingdoms. After the signing of the Sino-Nepalese 
Treaty on August 1, 1955, the relation between China and 
Nepal was provided for on the basis of the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Co-existence.7 Then a Chinese consulate -general 
was established in Katmandu, the capitol of Nepal, in the 
following years. And in 1960, the governments of Chinese 
Communists and Nepal signed the Sino-Nepalese Agreement on 
the Boundary Question.8 Therefore, China and Nepal became 
5 
6 
7 
G. S. Bharhava, The Battle of NEFA: The Undeclared War, 
(New York, Allied Publishers, 1964), p. 7. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
A Collection of Documents of Foreign Relations of the 
People's Republic of China: 1954-1955, Vol. 1, (Peking, 
World Knowledge, 1958), p. 10 
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"Nepal: Sino-Nepalese Treaty", United Asia, XII, No. 4, 
(April, 1960), pp. 391-392. 
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close friends. And, thus, anti -Indian feelings in Nepal 
grew steadily. To India, she has repeatedly stated that 
Nepal's geographical position dictated a special Nepalese - 
Indian relationship. This position was recognized in the 
international community. But now India had to face a com- 
petitor from the north who seemed to have won the first 
round. 
China also challenged India's influence both in 
Sikkim and Bhutan. According to the Indo-Sikkimese Treaty 
of 1950, Sikkim remained as to a protectorate of India in 
respect to foreign relations and defense.9 The situation 
in Sikkim became more complicated during the 1950's. Kazi 
Lhendup Dorji, the Chairman of Sikkim National Congress 
Party, pointed out that "China had advanced to Sikkim 
through many ways. 
As for Bhutan, the Maharaja of this tiny kingdom 
disclosed in January, 1961 that Peking unofficially had 
approached the Bhutanese Government with a request to open 
direct border talks, and had made an offer of economic aid 
for the development of Bhutan. Facing such a situation, 
9 
10 
Chandra Das Rai, "Sikkim; Gateway to India". United 
Asia. XII, No. 4, (April, 1960), p. 360. 
George N. Patterson, "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet 
and towards the Himalayan Border States". The China 
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India offered to Bhutan a major program of aid.11 However, 
China did her best to woo Bhutan away from its policy of 
friendship with India. And it seemed to work. 
Furthermore, China's policy toward Burma in 1960 left 
no doubt of the worsening of Sino-Indian relationships. 
That was the situation of the Himalayas before 1962. 
Sino-Burmese Treaty 
On January 25th to the 28th of 1960, in Peking, 
Communist China concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Non - 
Aggression with Burma.12 Under its terms, the Chinese 
accepted the British defined boundary except for the three 
village tracts and the area in the Wa State which was to be 
exchanged for the Nanwan Tract.13 It also provided for 
setting up a Joint Committee to survey and define the 
boundary. On October 1, in the same year, Prime Minister 
U Nu of Burma and Chou En-lai signed the Sino-Burmese 
Boundary Treaty in Peking.14 
11 
12 
13 
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Ibid., p. 199. 
Daphere E. Whittam, "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty", 
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Under its terms, the following items were listed: 
(1) Burma ceded 59 square miles in the Hpimaw, 
Gawlum Kangfang area. 
(2) Burma ceded 73 square miles in the Wa State. 
(3) Burma gained 85 square miles comprising the 
Namwan Assigned Tract. 
(4) Burma gained four villages and ceded two 
villages. 
(5) Burma gained about 5 square miles in the 
far north and ceded about 2 square miles in 
the eastern section.15 
Thus, it is clear to see that, for the loss of a small 
portion of territory, the Burmese obtained what they had 
long wanted. And even more important, British -defined 
boundary was recognized by the Peking Government.16 
China's willingness for signing the treaty was based 
on two facts. The first place, China wanted to show its 
righteousness in the eyes of the world. Secondly, China 
taught the Burmese that though China was a powerful nation, 
it would follow a "right" path to deal with its small neigh- 
bors. As to Burma, the signing of the agreement set a high 
mark for its foreign relations with China. Therefore, 
Burma, in urgent need of consolation after the civil strife 
15 
16 
Whittam, op cit., p. 181. 
The National Government in Taipei has never recognized 
the McMahon Line and condemned the Sino-Burmese Treaty 
as illegal. 
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On a wider view of the frontier question, India was 
trying to maintain a frontier along the crest of the 
Himalayas. The reason for this was that a great strategic 
disadvantage would be created for India if the Chinese 
were in possession of all the high passes and their south- 
ward exits into the Indian lowlands. The frontier could 
be left undefined in the old days because communications 
were so difficult and international contacts so few through- 
out the Himalayan region. But modern conditions of inter- 
national life need definite frontiers. Therefore, in his 
letter to Chou En-lai, dated September 26, 1959, Jawaharlal 
Nehru considered that the Government of India 
recognize that the India -China frontier which 
extends over more than 2500 kilometres has not 
been demarcated on the ground and disputes may 
therefore arise at some places along the tradi- 
tional frontier as to whether these places lie on 
the Indian or Tibetan side of this traditional 
frontier.17 
From this statement, it is clear to see that Nehru did not 
overlook the McMahon Line. What he was concerned about 
was the "traditional frontier". To him the "traditional 
frontier" simply meant the McMahon Line. He spoke to the 
17 Documents on the Boundary Question. (Peking, Foreign 
Language Press, 1960). p. 80. 
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Rajya Sabha on September 10, 1959, that "the McMahon Line, 
by which I simply mean the defined frontier, was our 
frontier.n18 
As to the Chinese, they have never recognized the 
McMahon Line. Even during the heavy fighting of the 
Chinese Civil War, the National Government sent a note to 
the Indian Government through its embassy at New Delhi on 
November 18, 1949. In this statement, the National 
Government repudiated the McMahon Line and denounced the 
validity of the Simla Conference.19 The Chinese Communist 
took the same stand on this matter. Chou En-lai, in his 
letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959, stated: 
the McMahon Line ... was determined by the British 
representative and the Tibetan representative 
behind the back of the representative of the 
Chinese Central Government through an exchange of 
secret notes ... The so-called McMahon Line was a 
product of the British policy of aggression against 
the Tibet region of China and has never been 
recognized by any Chinese Central Government and 
is, therefore, decidedly illega1.20 
Since China considered the McMahon Line illegal, the claims 
of the two countries were far apart. 
18 Nehru, op cit., p. 358. 
19 Lo Chia-lun, "Raise Up The Curtain on the Tibetan Issue 
In Sino-Indian Relations", Free China. III, No. 7, 
(July, 1950), p. 229. (in Chinese). 
20 
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For the convenience of discussion, the disputed area 
may be divided into three sectors: (1) The Northern 
Sector, consisting of the boundary between Ladakh and 
Tibet, (2) The Central Sector, covering the boundary 
between Panjab, Himachal Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Tibet, 
and (3) Eastern Sector, extending from the northeastern 
border of Bhutan to the Isu Raji pass on the northwest 
of Burma. 
In the Northwestern Sector, the Chinese claimed 
territory of about 33,000 square kilometers. In fact, 
China already had seized about 12000 square kilometers. 
Here the Indian case rested largely on a peace treaty 
concluded in September 1842, between Tibet and the Raja 
of Jammu. By this treaty, the Lhasa Government acknow- 
ledged "no other authority in Ladakh".21 Peking main - 
tamed that the Chinese Central Government of the day 
neither participated in the conclusion of the treaty nor 
ratified it. In his letter to Nehru dated December 17, 
1959, Chou En-lai stated that "this area has long been 
under Chinese jurisdiction and is of great importance to 
China. Since the Ching Dynasty, this area has been 
the traffic artery linking up the vast regions of Sinkiang 
21 Alastair Lamb, The China -India Border, (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1964). p. 69. 
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and western Tibet".22 The fact was that since 1950 the 
Chinese have made regular and busy use of the Sinkiang - 
Tibet highway. Therefore, China claimed that Aksai Chi 
was already under China's sovereignty. 
As in the Central Sector, the Chinese's claim involved 
a comparatively much smaller area. It is the area over 
which lesser disputes occurred. The area to which the 
Chinese laid claims were in the Spiti region: Nilang-Jadhang, 
Bara Hoti (Wu-je), Sangcha Malla, and Lapthal. In his 
letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959, Chou stated that 
this area "had always belonged to China, and was gradually 
invaded and occupied by the British thirty to forty years 
earlier."23 Nehru replied on September 26, 1959, that "the 
Government of India has always been in control of this 
area".24 In fact, China laid its claims on the ground that 
the people living in this area were mostly of Tibetan origin, 
but the difficult thing was to draw an ethnic frontier in 
this place. To India, she had to maintain the ownership 
over this area for keeping her "watershed" policy. The 
fact was that in the early nineteenth century the British 
began to extend their administrations into this area. 
22 
23 
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In the Eastern Sector, the Chinese claimed some parts 
of the North East Frontier Agency and a small portion of 
Assam. The Chinese's claim was based on the following two 
points: (1) The McMahon Line was an "illegal line", and 
(2) Until recently the area down to the plains of Assam 
was under Chinese jurisdiction. In regard to the first 
point, Chou insisted that the "McMahon Line was never 
intended to mark the Sino-Indian border. Consequently, 
China's failure in 1914 and later to object to it proved 
only that the Chinese Government was completely unaware 
of the existence of the so-called McMahon Line".25 Nehru 
replied on September 10, 1959 in a speech in Rajya Sabha 
that since China and Burma had "agreed to recognize the 
McMahon Line in so far as the Burmese frontier was con- 
cerned and the China -India frontier was concerned. That 
would take care of the whole of the McMahon Line."26 
As to the second point, it was true that from about 
the middle of the last century, some of the tribes living 
in the NEFA area began to enter into contact with India. 
Therefore, Nehru pointed out that the McMahon Line only 
"formalized the neutral, traditional, ethnic and adminis- 
trative boundary in the area."27 He continued to defend 
25 
26 
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Nehru, op cit., p. 351. 
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91 
the McMahon Line as "correctly represents the customary 
boundary in this area. The water -parting formed by the 
crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was 
accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples on 
both sides."28 
Military Conflict 
On the eve of the undeclared border war, China and 
India scolded each other with documented sources. On 
August 17, 1959, Peking asserted that twenty-two new Indian 
military strong points had been set up since that spring.29 
On September 15, the Government of India claimed that there 
were about 200 Chinese intruders who had infiltrated into 
NEFA.30 On the night of September 20, 1962, a serious 
military clash 
western corner 
was killed and 
took place in Chedong, a place at the 
of NEFA. 
north 
- 
China claimed that a Chinese officer 
another Chinese frontier guard wounded. India 
blamed China for provoking this clash and reported that 
three Indian soldiers were wounded.31 A new "attack" at 
the Cheo Jao Bridge was claimed by Peking on September 29.32 
28 
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From then on, there was a series of light fighting along 
the NEFA frontier. Ultimately on October 19, China started 
a "counter-attack" in Chedong area. In his book, The 
Battle of NEFA, Yr. G. S. Bhargava (Indian) claimed that 
during that first massive attack, "the enemy was two 
battalions strong - 2000 men - whereas the defenders were 
only 600."33 According to the New China News Agency 
reports, a "Large scale attack was waged by Indian troops 
into Sinkiang on the same day."34 So a full-scale military 
conflict was engaged in both West and East Sectors. 
The military victories helped the Chinese soldiers 
advance. Just a month after the undeclared war began, 
the Chinese army was down toward the Assamese towns of 
Tezpur and Sadiya. Thus, it was safe to say that the 
Indian soldiers were completely defeated in NEFA. As to 
Ladakh, the situation was the same. The Chinese troops 
had moved all the way to the limits of the Chinese boundary 
claims. This meant that China occupied nearly 14,000 
square miles of territory in Ladakh. 
Besides military campaigns, China then launched a 
peaceful offensive campaign. On November 21, 1962, Peking 
offered India a cease-fire.35 The offer was based on the 
33 
34 
35 
Bhargava, op. cit., p. 96. 
People's Daily. October 22, 1962. 
P.H.M. Jones, "Passes and Impasses; A Study of Sino- 
Indian Border disputes." Far Eastern Economic Review. 
XXXIX, No. 9. (February, 1963), p. 456. 
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grounds of Chinese Communist strategy of "fight -talk -fight", 
largely of a political nature with only little military 
consideration. While Nehru's prestige had been severly 
shaken, his illusion of peaceful co -existence with China 
shattered, China boasted her military power. The "cease- 
fire" offer once again showed that China was "reasonable". 
China had now proved that she could take the areas to 
which she laid claim by force if she chose to do so. 
Furthermore, the Chinese military victory would help China 
to extend her influence in the Himalayas. Then the Chinese 
troops slowly withdrew from NEFA and Ladakh. But this did 
not mean that the Sino-Indian border dispute was settled. 
It was clear that the trouble would recur some day. Only 
no one could tell when there would be another military con- 
flict. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of 1962, six nonaligned nations (Burma, 
Ceylon, Cambodia, Ghana, Indonesia, and the United Arab 
Republic) presented the Colombo Proposal for ending the 
Sino-Indian boundary military conflict. In this proposal 
the six nations suggested that: (1) In Ladakh, China 
should, as she offered, withdraw her forces 20 kilometers 
behind what she alleged to be the line of November 1959, 
while Indian forces might move right up to this line, 
(2) In the NEFA area, both sides might move troops right up 
to the YcYahon Line, except in the Chedong and Longju areas, 
where there was a difference of opinion about the border 
line, (3) As for the central sector, the proposal suggested 
that its problems would "be solved by peaceful means without 
resorting to force".1 
In January 1963, both China and India accepted the 
Colombo Proposal in principle, but it soon became apparent 
that each country had interpreted the proposal differently. 
Therefore, the bitterness still remained in the Sino-Indian 
1 
"China's Rebuff to Colombo Powers," India's Fight for 
Territorial Integrity. Publication Division, The Govern- 
ment of India, New Delhi. 1963. p. 27. 
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boundary problem. From then on, there was no progress in 
solving the border dispute. After all, the Sino-Indian 
boundary question has existed for nearly half a century, 
and there are no urgent reasons for settling all pending 
issues overnight. 
The McMahon Line and the Three Sectors 
Though it is nearly impossible for a private person 
to judge the disputed areas, the author believes that it is 
his duty to extend this survey to a definite conclusion. 
In working toward this goal, it was necessary to briefly 
reconsider the disputed areas. 
Since the Simla Conference of 1914 proposed the 
McMahon Line, the Sino-Indian border question has become 
a tenacious knot between the two countries. The documents 
from both the National Government of China and the Chinese 
Communist regime proved that China had never recognized the 
McMahon Line. China laid its claim on the grounds that 
she had never ratified the Simla Convention of 1914. By 
this, China stressed that the Simla Convention, which was 
signed by the delegates of Tibet and Britain, was merely 
a draft. Furthermore, the McMahon Line never was marked on 
the ground or definitely defined. In his book, The China - 
India Border, Mr. Alastair Lamb stated that "the McMahon 
Line is, on the whole, quite a fair and reasonable boundary 
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between China and India along the Assam Himalaya."2 
But the fact was, no matter whether the YcYahon Line was 
fair or not, it was still illegal. The debate should 
focus on the McMahon Line's legal case. Anything beyond 
this should not be brought out. Furthermore, according to 
the law of nations, the ratification was an essential element 
to legalize an international treaty. Therefore, it was 
correct to say that the McMahon Line should neither have 
existed nor be the draft for future Sino-Indian boundary 
settlement. 
In considering those disputed areas, it was thought 
best to have a brief review for each sector. The most con- 
troversial area was the Eastern Sector. Though the Govern- 
rdent of Britain established the NEFA, however, the people 
living here were in far closer contact with Tibet than 
India. And the region was of some interest to the Tibetan 
authorities. On the other hand, India considered this area 
as its utmost frontier. India could not maintain its 
"watershed" policy without having NEFA. It left no doubt 
that India would try to keep and occupy this area. Thus, 
it became clear that NEFA would become a place sought by 
both China and India in the future boundary conference. 
2 Alastair Lamb, China -India Border. (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1963), p. 169. 
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The best solution to this problem would be a compromise. 
After a future joint survey and careful study, China and 
India should demarcate a boundary between them. It would 
mean that India would cede a portion of NEFA to China. 
The Central Sector did not bring very much trouble in 
the 1960's. But one thing similar to the East Sector was 
the debate over the "watershed". The disputes of this area 
were basically concerned with a conflict between the "water- 
shed" alignment and the fact of history and occupation. 
Though the debate had existed between China and India, this 
sector remained quite during the military conflict of 1962. 
The major disputed places of this area were Spiti, Nilang- 
Jadhang, Bara Hoti, and Sancha Malla. It might be fair to 
both sides if China took over those Tibetan inhabited areas 
and the rest of the area was left to India. 
In the Northwestern Sector, though China has claimed 
nearly 33,000 square kilometers, only about half the size of 
what she had claimed should adhere to China. It was true 
that the Chinese sovereignty already was over a large part 
called Aksai Chi. The place has been proved as a part of 
China by the construction of the Tibet -Sinkiang highway. 
Furthermore, the names of some areas which the Chinese 
claimed such as Aksai Chi and Karakash are of Uighur origin.3 
China laid her claims on the grounds that the Government 
of China already effectively controlled Aksai Chi during the 
3 Uighur; native born of Sinkiang people. 
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last two centuries. 
In September 1958, Chinese border guards encountered 
fifteen Indian soldiers in this area but when those admit- 
ted that they were trespassing to do reconnaissance work, 
they were escorted back 
the border.4 There 
India and nobody in 
got the border line 
it might be correct 
In other words, the 
was 
over what the Chinese considered 
no serious debate follow-up by 
China seemed to know just where India 
shown today on Indian maps. Therefore, 
to say that China would keep Aksai Chi. 
future settlement should be based on 
the status quo boundary line. 
Prospect 
With no settlement in sight, China and India seem to 
stay on the stage of dispute which might lead to unfore- 
seen and unpredictable consequences. This rapid deteriora- 
tion of Sino-Indian relations, in, sharp contrast to the 
previous romantic phase, has been a puzzle to most poeple 
of the free world. Why did China abandon her former policy 
of apparent friendship with India and adopt one of open 
hostility? 
4 Anna L. Strong, "The China -India Border", New World Review. 
XXVII, No. 10, (November, 1959), p. 49. 
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Of the many 'answers, as the author mentioned in the 
previous chapters, one possibility is the competition 
between China and India over Tibet. Another is the situation 
in China in the 1960's. The aggressive policy toward India 
might be prompted by the need to divert the attention of 
the Chinese people from the failure of the Communists on the 
home front. During these years the Government of Chinese 
Communists was facing the failure of the "Great Leap 
Forward Movement". A series of national disasters which 
occurred brought the country almost to the edge of famine. 
Mao Tse-tung then had no other choice but to divert the 
attention of the people by pursuing a policy of adventure 
abroad. 
But perhaps the most plausible explanation of Chinese 
behavior was that Peking was pursuing the policy of restor- 
ing China's old glory. To attain this goal, in the first 
place, China has to extend Peking hegemony over all those 
regions and peoples which once belonged to the Chinese 
empire. Secondly, China was trying to erase from memory 
all humilations and defeats of the past. The third method 
was to give the people a new sense of pride. Above all, 
the Peking regime was tempted to reshape the map of the 
world in the Communist pattern. Militant nationalism and 
the revolutionary movement of Communists were the two 
essential elements of the foundation of Mao's philosophy. 
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Apart from the above survey, it was necessary to cast 
attention on the prospect of the Sino-Indian border dispute. 
The author believes that though the McMahon Line was illegal, 
Chinese Communists should not have waged the military action 
in 1962. These were two distinct and separate things. And 
it was wrong to say that anyone who criticized the Chinese 
military action must be considered a believer of the McMahon 
Line. 
The fact is that the bitterness between China and India 
has not diminished and still exists. Therefore, no one 
can predict the future of Sino-Indian relations. But it 
might be right to say that it remains possible that the 
Chinese would attack again in the future. Although China 
proclaimed herself the leader of Afro 
-Asian bloc, the 
military action of 1962 was not too well received by the 
nations of this bloc. This left no doubt that the so-called 
nonalighment nations could not work together solidly as they 
did before the year of 1962. And it is wrong to say that 
the Sino-Indian military conflict was the only cause for 
weakening this bloc. However, the truth is that China and 
India, the two essential pillars of the bloc, have gotten 
into a hostile relationship since then. 
The military conflict of 1962 not only affected the 
nonalighment nations but also endangered world peace. The 
fact was that the Himalayan disputes have made very clear 
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that a local war may become general. India has appealed 
to Britain and the United States for arms.5 It is impos- 
sible to guess whether Britain and the United States would 
actually fight against China, but it is certainly possible 
that this might occur. If it did, it is probable that 
China would compose its disagreements with Russia. In this 
case, the war would become a world -scale one. 
Another result from the military conflict of 1962 
was that the concerned governments were tempted to whip up 
warlike feelings among their people. This specially 
happened in India over the border issue. The New Delhi 
Government misled the people by covering the fact that the 
Chinese had a legal case which was as strong as the Indian 
case. And, thus, made clear that to examine China's legal 
case was what was needed for negotiation or arbitration. 
To conclude this paper, the author, therefore, believes 
that a peaceful settlement could solve the Sino-Indian 
boundary question. With this, it would not only ease the 
tension between China and India but also give a good pattern 
for solving the India -Pakistan Kashmir boundary issue. 
"Text of Broadcast by Nehru on November 14", Prime 
Minister on Chinese Aggression. (New Delhi, Publication 
Division, the Government of India, 1963). p. 93. 
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To fulfill the suggested peaceful settlement, it is 
believed that the best solution is to appoint a field survey 
party preferably made up of neutral representatives, under 
a neutral chairman, acceptable to both the parties, and 
allow them to conduct a thorough survey of the entire 
border of the disputed areas. This neutral body should 
analyse the historical background and study the ancient 
treaties. They should be allowed to make whatever inquiries 
they consider necessary, including personnel interrogation of 
elderly inhabitants. Such a commission should bear in mind 
the recent political happenings in both the countries. Then 
only a workable formula could be evolved, and a peaceful 
settlement of the burning question worked out. However, 
both the countries have agreed to stop sending further 
patrols in this disputed area, in order to avoid further 
clashes. Both the countries have also agreed to reach a 
peaceful settlement of the problem, with the help of ne- 
gotiations and conferences. 
The measures outlined above are, in part, difficult 
of acceptance and are sure to meet with strong opposition. 
Perhaps further experience of crisis may make them accept- 
able, but perhaps not. A choice is before the concerned 
peoples and their governments. No matter what way will be 
adopted, it is true that the people of the world have learned 
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a lesson from the,crisis of the Himalayas in the last 
decade. This should be borne in mind and never forgotten. 
104 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The author wishes to express sincere gratitude and 
indebtedness to Dr. Louis H. Douglas, major professor, 
for his untiring valuable suggestions, corrections, and 
criticism toward the completion of this paper. 
Appreciation is extended to Dr. William W. Boyer, 
the head of the Political Science Department, for the 
perusal of the thesis and for giving valuable guidance. 
The author wishes to express his grateful thanks to 
Dr. A. Bower Sageser of the History Department and 
Dr. Merlin D. Gustafson of the Political Science Depart- 
ment for their advise and encouragement through this 
course of study. 
Gratitude is expressed to the librarians of Kansas 
State University and the University of Kansas for their 
assistance in finding references. 
AIPEN DI CES 
 IMMMINISIRSINIP 
LEGEND 
Mcken na,01.0r, shrogyna-ds os,th'un Chrmve 
A0e perrddelrees, A/c. 7. /949 
aad C9c,. /942 
he seem:net/Iv ocry.led by i esn b-bqos 
AbeAlebbn.hne 
rbekebrociabil contra/ kbverb f 
sidts as a/ 4,0frebybe7- 7 /959 
Chobesr "err,lany becup/bki by /no.4, 
freAb/os as oc 4evewsber 7 /9s9 
MAP SHOWING IFIIDIA:S MILITARY STRONG -POINTS IT SET UP ON 
THE NORTH OF TRADITIONAL BOUNDARY IN THE PERIOD 
BETWEEN NOV.1, 1959 AND OCT. 20,1962 
Wm, 7T.Of 
C 
MAP SHOW INGTME EIJTIRf 
GINO- INDIAN BOUNDARY 
H I A 
/ s...4 L i-- ell UiLi 
-%..../A., 1.' 4, 
-' 
(..i 
' 
(. i 0 
1 
4 /A 167;11? 
... 
. 
./ , 
r -.11 
SOUZC-E 7/7e5b7o-Le,on esou7dory QueshOn fret.', For e5,, Lon_sruoye Gress 942 
MAP SHOWING THE AREAS CLAIMED 
BY INDIA 
361. 
Karakoram pa% 
°LA 
34 
0 VSpvtO9or LaY 
, 
Kodak Pkons 
1. 
ipsiirki Pao 
k /paling Sum& 
4 
Tko 
1. THE WESTERN AND 
MIDDLE SECTORS 
A 
A 
0,0 
3Zong 
t.N. 
r-' 
N 
(1 N E 
MAP SHOW INGTHE ENTIRE 
SING -INDIAN DOUHDARY 
C * 
N 
1.1 
S.KKIM 
/ 4 k K-<Ktiuy 
L. 
PA 
LE GEN D 
////////,' Area. chair,,mr/ ey imdie 
The McAlohon CO". 
Ir 
1- 
T4e ao.mr/my aktomeor 
chrom ed by froo( ,u ,vosOar/ 
krther nark r.e 4lAK-Alskorr 
Line: rocker:A, ,,,lo 
Che rehokerr.raor, to -v.* 
sod other p/area ArhIch 
lie /tart!, of ihe 
Cht Doe 
Tsoona Nang 
).,\.Kkiort 
S A /1 
C 
12.THE EASTERN SECTOR 
Theral 
..., 
......., 
I' 4 N cs 
.., 
0 0 
_ 
_,......-.--1' K (- It f b ,/ MAP t.k . A 
% t 
L_ 
KC. 
SCOURGE The Srere rirmrkearr raorderrickry E)creor.re,o 
AVA-rtry Frorre9ro lorrguoye /-refs /`/.62. 
MAP SHOWING THE TRADITIONAL CUSTOMARY 
BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN CHINA AND INDIA 
4, 
0 
SIAWQ I N K 
Pseaj I*1 
.%) 
1/4... 
`- 
-1 
4 
pF 
7' 
4.e ' s 
e 
eee' 
C 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
It 
-r 
" u TSAAIGPO RI vt4, 
,..... _ "....... 
Tone 4.1.9 
4 -...: ...1 ,.. ./"..4s) ,./ 
- 
-, 
N. 
-s.....," i ,,, , ! 
....Auk. 
; 1# f EPUNAK MA i . te.T-......e 
,.. fia i V "..- '-..  
'N kau4,8_0 8 H U T A N ( 
'L.. k 
-'''. 
',. 
..............,. 
if 
e t 
-! 
8R 
A 
1 
Iv' 
LEGEND 
fir711117/871/17 
The trockfionel custoinay 
botoadry hex (fern 
O%.. end India 
OMerinterneAnone 
Aleundoey 
Pro.vinc4/ bounder" 
-JR 
eTtoyult 
oillio 
17# 
-4 
SOURCE The 
P-0,e9n La . -14.05e Pee. 942 
oci 
INO-BaRMEST: RUNNRY SETTLE MEN T 
Erahmaputra R. 
Kachin State 
A 
/../ 
Irrawaddy R. ->''7 
0 30 
I 
120 
Scale in miles 
CHINA 
Salween R. / 
N'Maikha R. 
Hpimaw 
Gawlum 
Kansfang 
25° N 
Namwan Tract 
1/4 
...a. ...% 
C-D: McMahon Line 
D-E: Irrawaddy-Salween Watershed 
F --G:2941 Line 
Shaded areas indicate territory transferred under terms of Boundary Treaty 
Cross -hatched areas shown as Chinese territory in maps used by both Nationalist and Communist governments 
1 q bo 
SO s: Pa.,44- Affairs. I% 
110 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Public Documents 
A Collection of Documents of Modern Chinese History: 1800- 
1900. Tso, Shun S. (ed), Taipei, Chung Hwa Co., 1958. 
(in Chinese). 
A Collection of Documents of Ching Dynasty, 2 Vols., Taipei, 
Wen Hai Book, 1963. (in Chinese). 
A Collection of Documents 
People's Republic of 
Knowledge, 1958. (in 
of Foreign Relations of the 
China, 3 Vols., Peking, World 
Chinese). 
A Collection of Documents of Tibet, 2 Vols., Shanghai, 
Commercial Press, 1958. (in Chinese). 
A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sarads, Vol. XIV, 
Aitchison, C. U. (ed). Calcutta, 1929. 
The Boundary Problem of China and India: Statements, 
Correspondences, Peking, The People Press, 1962. 
Tin Chinese). 
Chen, Y.C. (ed), Treaties and Agreements Between the Republic 
of China and other Powers: 1929-1954, Washington, D.C., 
Sino-American Publishing, 1957. 
China and the Asian -African Conference (documents), 
Foreign Language Press, 1955. 
Concernincr the Question of Tibet, (documents), Peking, 
Foreign Press, 1959. 
Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking 
Foreign Language Press, 1960. 
India's Fight for Territorial Integrity, New Delhi, 
Ministry of Information, The Government of India, 1963. 
Indian Prime Minister On Chinese Aggression Boundary Question, 
3 Vols. (Indian Parliament, Press Conference, Speeches), 
New Delhi, Ministry of External Affairs, the Government 
of India, 1963. 
Peking, 
Ling, Nai M. (ed). Tibetan Sourcebook, Hong Kong, Union 
Printing, 1964. 
111 
Mayers, William F..(ed). Treaties Between the Empire of 
China and Foreign Powers, Shanghai, North China 
Herald Press, 1902. 
Nehru -Chou Correspondence: Texts of letter exchanged 
between the Prime Ministers of India and China on the 
Issue of border disputes and border incidents, Bombay, 
United Asia, Vol. XII, 1960. 
Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, 
September 1946 - April 1961, New Delhi, Ministry of 
Information, the Government of India, 1961. 
Selected Documents on Sino-Indian Relations: December 1961 - 
May 1962, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1962. 
The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, Peking, Language Press, 
1962. 
Sino-Nepalese Treaty of 1960: Agreement on the Boundary 
Question, Bombay, United Asia, 1960. 
Sun,Yat-sen, San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the 
People (selected speeches), translated into English 
by Frank W. Price, Chungking, Ministry of Information, 
the Republic of China, 1943. 
Books 
Bell, Charles, Tibet: Past and Present. Oxford, The 
Clarendon Press, 1924. 
Berkes, Ross N. The Diplomacy of India. Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1958. 
Bhargava, G.S. The Battle of NEFA. Bombay, Allied 
Publishers, 1964. 
Boyd, R. G. Communist China's Foreign Policy. New York, 
Frederick A., 1962. 
Carrasco, Pedro. Land and Polity in Tibet. Seattle, 
University of Washington Press, 1959. 
Chakravarti, P. C. India's China Policy. Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1962. 
112 
Chin, Keh M. A Shbrt History of Sino-Indian Friendship. 
Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1958. 
. The Historical Stories About the Friendship 
Between Chinese and Indian People. Peking, Chinese 
Youth, 1957. (in Chinese). 
Dalai Lama. My Land and My People. New York, McGraw-Hill, 
1962. 
Eekelen, W. F. Van. Indian Foreign Policy and the Border 
Dispute with China. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. 
Fisher, Margaret W., Rose, Leo E., and Huttenback, Robert A. 
Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry In Ladakh. 
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1963. 
Fisher, Margaret W. and Bandurant, J. V. Indian Views of 
Sino-Indian Relations: Indian Press Digest. Berkley, 
University of California Press, 1956. 
Fleming, Peter. Bayonets to Lhasa: The First Full Account 
of The British Invasion of Tibet in 1904. New York, 
Harper and Brother, 1961. 
Gupta, Karunakan. Indian Foreign Policy. Calcutta, World 
Press, 1956. 
Holdich, Sir T. Political Frontier and Boundary Making. 
London, 1916. 
Hahn, Emily. China Only Yesterday: 1850-1950. New York, 
Doubleday and Co., 1963. 
Huang, Ta-shou. The History of China. Taipei, Great China 
Co., 1959. (in Chinese). 
Jain, Girilal. PanchSheela and After. New York, Asia 
Publishing, 1960. 
Karunakaran, K.P. India. In World Affairs: 1950-1953. 
London, Oxford University Press, 1958. 
Lamb, Alastair. The China -India Border: The Origins of 
The Disputed Boundaries. New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1964. 
Lattimore, Owen. Inner Asian Frontier Of China. New York, 
American Geographical Society, 1940. 
113 
Studies In Frontier History: 1928-1958. 
London, Oxford University Press, 1962. 
Li,Tieh T. The Historical Status of Tibet. New York, 
King's Crown Press, 1956. 
Lineburger, P.M.A. The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen. 
Baltimore, The John Hopkins Press, 1957. 
Maraini, Fosco. Secret Tibet. New York, Viking Press, 
1952. 
Mitter, J. P. Betrayal of Tibet. Bombay, Allied Publishers, 
1964. 
Moraes, Frank. The Revolt In Tibet. New York, McMillan Co., 
1960. 
Morse, Hoser B. The International Relations of the Chinese 
Empire. 3 Vols. New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 
1918. 
O'Connell, D. P. International Law. 2 Vols. New York, 
Dobbs Ferry, 1965. 
Palmer, Norman D. The Indian Political System. Boston, 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1961. 
Patterson, George N. Peking vs. Delhi. New York, 
Frederick A., 1964. 
Patel, Satyavrata R. Foreign Policy of India. Bombay, N.M. 
Tripathi, 1960. 
Powell -Price, J. C. A History of India. New York, Thomas 
Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1955. 
Russell, Bertrand. Unarmed Victories: The Sino-Indian 
Dispute. Baltimore, Penguin, 1963. 
Shabad, Theodre. China's Changing Map. New York, F. A. 
Praeger, 1965. 
Periodicals 
A Student of Tibetan Affairs. "A Study of Sino-Tibetan 
Relationship: 1949-1956", United Asia, XI, No. 4, 
(1949). pp. 165-173. 
114 
Armstrong, Hamilton F. "Thoughts Along The China Border - 
Will Neutrality Be Enough", Foreign Affairs, (January 
1960), pp. 238-260. 
Brinkworthe, Ian. "Bhutan, The Unknown Country", 
Geographical Magazine, XXXVI, (October 1963), pp. 320- 
335. 
Butwell, Richard. "The Sino-Burmese Border Truce", The 
New Leader, ILIII, No. 9, (February 1960). pp. 15-17. 
Caroe, Sir Olaf. "The Indian 
-Chinese Boundary Dispute". 
Geographical Journal, CXXVII, No. 3, (1961), pp. 345- 
34 
. "Geography and Ethnics of NEFA", United 
Asia, XII, No. 4, (1960), pp. 315-322. 
Chao, Kuo C. "The Chinese -Indian Controversy", Current 
History, XXXVII, No. 220, (1950), pp. 354-361. 
Chopra, Yaharaj K. "The Himalayan Border War: An Indian 
Military Review", Military Review, ILIII, No. 5, 
(May 1963), pp. 8-16. 
Elwin V. "The North East Frontier Agency of India", 
Geographical Magazine, XXIX, (1956), pp. 405-416. 
Field, A. R. "Bhutan, Khan and the Upper Assam Line", Orbis, 
(Summer 1959), pp. 180-192. 
Fitch, Geraldine. "Tibet Revolts Against Chinese Rule", 
The New Leader, ILII, No. 10 (March 1959, pp. 16-17. 
Furer-Hainensdorf, C. V. "On the McMahon Line", Swiss 
Review of World Affairs, IX, No. 7 (1959), pp. 11-12. 
Gross, Ernest A. "Tibetans Plan for Tomorrow", Foreign 
Affairs, (January 1965), pp. 136-142. 
Harrison, Selig S. "Troubled India and Her Neighbors", 
Foreign Affairs, (January 1956), 312-330. 
Hudson, G. F. "China Pushes Southward", The New Leader, 
ILII, No. 37, (October 1959), pp. 6-8. 
. "The Frontier of China and Assam: Back - 
Ground to the Fighting", China Quarterly, XII, 
(November 1962), pp. 203-206. 
115 
Jones, P.H.M. "Passes and Impasses: A Study of the Sino- 
Indian Bordei Disputes", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
XXXIX, No. 9, (February 1963), pp. 443-458. 
Kozicki, Richard T. "The Sino-Burmese Frontier Problem", 
Eastern Survey, (March 1957), pp. 33-38. 
Levi, W. "India's Himalayan Border", Contemporary Review, 
No. 1075, (July 1955), pp. 40-44. 
Limaye, Yadhu. "Chinese Aggression and India's Reaction". 
United Asia, XI, No. 6, (1959), pp. 519-524. 
Martin, Kingley. "The Frontier of Tibet", New Statesman, 
(March 1958), pp. 399-402. 
Narayan, Jayaprakash. "Tibet: Asia's Hungary", The New 
Leader, ILII, No. 16, (April 1959), pp. 7-8. 
Nehru, Jawaharlal. "Changing India", Foreign Affairs, 
(April 1963), pp. 453-465. 
Patterson, George. "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and 
Toward the Himalayan Border States", The China 
Quarterly, No. 12, (1962), pp. 191-202. 
Pringsheim, Klaus H. "China, India and their Himalayan 
Border: 1961-1963", Asian Survey, III, No. 10, 
(October 1963), p. 474. 
Rose, Leo E. "Conflict in the Himalayas", Military Review, 
XLIII, No. 2, (February 1963), pp. 3-15. 
Sakrikar, Dinkar. "Sinn -Indian Border Dispute". United 
Asia, XII, No. 2, pp. 109-111. 
Sabavala, Sharokh. "New Delhi vs. Peking", The New Leader, 
XLII, No. 16, (April 1959), pp. 7-8. 
. "Tibet Agitates India", The New Leader, 
XLII, No. 27, (July 1959), pp. 8-9. 
Sterimer, H. Arther. "India Looks to Her Northern Frontiers", 
The Eastern Survey, (November 1959), p. 167. 
Strong, A. L. "The China -India Border", New World Review, 
XXVII, No. 10, (November 1959), pp. 42-52. 
"Tibet, What Happened", XXVII, No. 6, (June 
1959), pp. 8-18. 
116 
Wilber, D. N. "The International Aspects of Border Disputes 
in Himalayan Region", United Asia, XII, No. 4, (1960), 
pp. 385-389. 
Whittam, Daphne E. "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty", 
Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, No. 2, (Summer 1961), pp. 174- 
183 
Wint, Guy. "China and Asia", The China Quarterly, (January 
1960), pp. 61-71. 
Newspapers 
People's Daily, Peking, "The Revolution In Tibet and Nehru's 
Philosophy", May 6, 1959. (in Chinese). 
, Nov. 6, 1962. 
, July 3, 1959. 
, Jan. 12, 1956. 
April 30, 1959. 
, Sept. 30, 1959. 
Oct. 22, 1962. 
Asian Recorder, New Delhi, December 1956, PP - 
Peking Review, Peking, Aug. 17, 1962, p. 5. 
General Works 
1182-1185. 
Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 27, New York, Americana Corp- 
oration, 1966. 
Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago, E. B. Inc., 1964, XIII. 
The New International Year Book, New York, Funk & Wagnalls, 
1964. 
THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER CONTROVERSY 
by 
THOMAS BAN KING LEE 
B. A., National Chengchi University, Taipei, 1959 
AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirement for the degree 
MASTER OF ARTS 
Department of Political Science 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
1966 
I 
The areas which are involved in the Sino-Indian border 
dispute stretch from the Karakoram Pass in the extreme 
part of Kashmir to the middle of the Assam Himalayas. 
high level ground 
inhabited, and of 
military reasons. 
problem are China 
an important role 
north 
This 
territory is mountainous, very sparsely 
no importance to either 
The major counterparts 
party except for 
in this 
and India. However, Tibet also 
boundary 
has played 
in this border issue. Certain of the 
neighboring states such as Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim are 
also involved in the China -India border dispute. 
This problem has become increasingly complicated during 
the last fifty years for various reasons. Therefore, it is 
necessary to explore not only the review of the geography 
and the peoples in this area, but also to examine the his- 
torical background of this area. 
The materials the author found in the Kansas State 
University and the University of Kansas libraries have shown 
that both China and India have issued a pile of maps and 
abundant documents allocating the areas in question to the 
one claiming them. Where there is such a conflict between 
the statements of the two sides, the author believes that 
these maps and documents should not serve as a blueprint to 
settle the dispute. These are some of the factors making it 
almost impossible for a private person to reach a definite 
conclusion about the territorial questions involved. 
2 
However, in.this paper, the author bases his opinions 
on the following facts. In the first place, since China 
never ratified the treaty formulated by the Simla Convention 
of 1914, the McMahon Line should not be uncritically accepted 
for the settlement of the border issue. 
Secondly, Communist China was the invader of India in 
the military boundary conflict late in 1962. From the 
materials at hand about the Indian and Chinese dispute, the 
author believes that the reason that the Chinese Red armies 
were sent to Ladakh and NEFA was a combination of both geo- 
graphic and political facts. This complicated the already 
confusing situation. 
Thirdly, the evidence left little doubt that a regional 
war could lead to a full scale nuclear war. Therefore, 
the best way to settle the frontier problem is by using 
peaceful means. The counterparts should send their most able 
people to a conference table to examine every phase of this 
situation. The author strongly believes that modern national- 
ism, especially in developing nations, is the chief source 
of friction among nations. 
To conclude this paper, the author believes that a con- 
ference composed of the most able people from each of the 
interested countries should be held to determine just where 
the line of demarcation should be. Only with a reasonable 
permanent settlement of this boundary problem among the 
interested nations can peace be maintained in this disputed 
area. 
